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INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided INS v.
Zacarias.' The decision was one of only three cases2 in which the high
court has directly interpreted and applied the substantive provisions of
the 1980 Refugee Act.3
INS v. Zacarias involved the political asylum and withholding of
deportation claim of a young Guatemalan male who fled his country out
of fear that antigovernment guerrillas who had tried to recruit him
1. INS v. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
2. The two other such cases decided by the Court were INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984) and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
3. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.). The 1980 Refugee Act provides two forms of relief for individuals fearing
persecution who are present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry -
political asylum or withholding of deportation. An individual may apply for and be granted
political asylum if she can establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(A) (1980). An individual can apply for and shall be
granted withholding of deportation if she can establish that her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980). The two forms of relief vary in three
significant respects: (1) the burden of proof for asylum is lower than that required for
withholding of deportation; (2) political asylum is a discretionary form of relief, while a grant
of withholding of deportation is mandatory if the applicant meets the requisite burden of
proof; (3) a grant of political asylum leads to legal permanent residency, while a grant of
withholding only entitles the applicant to protection from being returned to the country of
feared persecution, and does not otherwise provide any rights to permanent residency within
the United States. Id.
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would either force him to join or would retaliate against him for his
continued refusal. The immigration judge denied relief and was upheld
by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals granted political asylum to the applicant,4 and the case went to
the U.S. Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari brought by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, held that Jairo
Elias Zacarias was not a refugee within the meaning of the 1980 Refu-
gee Act because he had failed to prove that any harm he would suffer
was "on account of political opinion" within the meaning of the 1980
Refugee Act. The Supreme Court's decision was based upon an interpre-
tation of the phrase "on account of' which requires proof of the perse-
cutor's motivation or intent.
The Zacarias decision, which is troubling for many reasons, is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent in other areas, where protec-
tion has been narrowed by shifting analysis away from the effect or
impact on the claimant or victim and placing it on the intent of the
defendant or persecutor. Pursuant to this analytical model, if intent
cannot be demonstrated, relief is unavailable regardless of the egre-
giousness of the harm. The Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith5 represents this
trend in the jurisprudence of the free exercise of religion.6
The Supreme Court's requirement of intent is problematic for an
array of reasons, not the least of which is that it is supported neither by
the plain language nor by the legislative history of the 1980 Refugee
Act. Furthermore, it is contrary to guiding international authority on the
issue. In addition, the focus on the intent of the persecutor makes little
sense from the policy perspective. The overarching objective of the
domestic and international refugee regime is protection of potential
victims of persecution, not punishment of persecutors. In such a context,
4. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
5. Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a statute which
affects an individual's religious practice is not prohibited by the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause, as long as the statute is neutral and does not embody an intent to interfere
with religious practice. Id. The Smith decision overturned the Court's own prior decision that
"[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963)).
6. Congress recently passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to reverse
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb.
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the inquiry should be on the effect of persecution on the victim and not
on the intent of the persecutor.
The Zacarias decision is troubling for another reason: it places an
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the applicant, who must divine the
motivation of her persecutor and then carry the burden of proof on this
issue. This requirement fails to recognize the complexity of a persecu-
tor's motivation, as well as the inherent difficulties of proof in these
types of proceedings. The rule in Zacarias has had an immediate and
visible impact.7 Its "narrow[,] grudging ' ' construction has limited pro-
tection to asylum seekers and will continue to shape the contours of
refugee jurisprudence in a fashion that makes a mockery of the frequent-
ly stated United States commitment to "human rights and humanitarian
concerns" underlying the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act.9
The following sections will discuss in greater detail the profound
defects of the Court's Zacarias decision. Section I will discuss the
interpretation of key provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act, and describe
the case of Jairo Elias Zacarias. Section II will review the plain lan-
guage and legislative intent of the Act, including the congressional
purpose of conforming to the 1967 Protocol. Section III will consider
issues of burden of proof, and will examine the substantive impact
which Zacarias has had on refugee cases. Section IV will focus on
religious persecution as a paradigm of the inadequacy of an intent-based
requirement and will examine the adverse impact the Zacarias rule has
had on asylum cases involving claims of religious persecution. Section
IV will also contrast the shrinking U.S. concept of religious freedom in
refugee and constitutional law with the more liberal and protective-
oriented trend in international law. Section V will provide a survey of
the requirement of intent in other relevant areas of law as a comparison
and contrast with the rule in Zacarias. Section VI suggests an elimina-
tion of the intent requirement, and proposes a revised framework for ad-
judicating claims under the 1980 Refugee Act. Finally, this article will
suggest that just as Congress has intervened to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in Oregon v. Smith with its passage of the Religious
7. See infra Section III.B, discussing the troubling decisions which are the progeny of
Zacarias.
8. "The narrow grudging construction of the concept of 'political opinion' that the Court
adopts today is inconsistent with the basic approach to this statute that the Court endorsed in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca ...." INS v. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
141. "The Refugee Act of 1979 establishes for the first time a comprehensive United States
refugee resettlement and assistance policy. It reflects one of the oldest themes in America's
history - welcoming homeless refugees to our shores. It gives statutory meaning to our
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns ..... Id.
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Freedom Restoration Act, it should act to undo the harm visited upon
the 1980 Refugee Act by the Supreme Court in Zacarias.
1. THE i980 REFUGEE ACT: INTERPRETATION OF KEY
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1980-1992
A. Background
The 1980 Refugee Act was enacted to bring the United States into
compliance with obligations it had undertaken in ratifying the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees' and with the United Na-
tions Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees," which is incor-
porated by reference into the 1967 Protocol.
12
The key provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act mirror those of the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. The Convention and the Protocol
define a refugee as a person with "a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion"3 and urge States to "facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees."' 4 Article 33(1) of the Con-
vention and Protocol prohibit the expulsion or return of an individual
whose life or freedom would be threatened on account of the aforemen-
tioned enumerated grounds. The 1980 Refugee Act incorporates these
provisions almost verbatim. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) defines a refugee
as an individual with a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a par-
ticular social group, and provides for the discretionary grant of asylum
to an individual who meets this definition. 5 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
requires the withholding of deportation of an individual who can
establish that her life or freedom would be threatened on account of
these grounds.'
6
10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
11. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The terms of the Convention were sub-
sequently incorporated into the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
12. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, art. 1(1), incorporating articles 2-34 of the 1951
Convention. 1951 Convention, supra note II.
13. 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, art. 1.
14. 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art. 34; 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, art. 34.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
16. The distinctions between asylum and withholding are outlined in note 3, supra.
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By adopting the international definition of refugee, the 1980 Refu-
gee Act constituted a significant departure from prior United States law,
which admitted refugees on the basis of geographical and ideological
factors. 17 The definition of refugee in the Convention and Protocol,
which was incorporated into the 1980 Refugee Act, is neutral and does
not contain a preference for individuals of a particular nationality or
ideology. When Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act it removed the
geographical and ideological restrictions that had existed in United
States law for nearly three decades.' 8
B. Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca: The Supreme Court
Establishes Burden of Proof
The statute that defines refugee, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A), and the
statute that provides for withholding of deportation, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(1), are parallel in structure. Claims under both statutes may
be broken down analytically into three constituent components: (1) type
of harm (persecution for recognition as a refugee, threat to life or free-
dom for withholding); (2) likelihood of harm; and (3) causal connection
between the harm and the five enumerated grounds: race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
In the early 1980s, the greatest controversy regarding the 1980
Refugee Act centered on the question of the likelihood of harm neces-
sary to establish eligibility for relief. In asylum cases the applicant is
required to show past persecution or a "well-founded fear," while in
withholding of deportation cases she must show that her life or freedom
"would be threatened." The Circuit Courts of Appeal were in conflict as
to whether the "well-founded fear" and "would be threatened" standards
denoted the same likelihood of harm.' 9 This issue brought the 1980
Refugee Act before the Supreme Court twice for interpretation, and the
Supreme Court decisions of INS v. Stevic2° and INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca2 resolved these questions. In Stevic, the Court interpreted the
17. A predecessor statute had limited relief to those fleeing a communist-dominated
country or a country within the general area of the Middle East. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)
(1952).
18. "The Refugee Act incorporates the international definition of refugee from the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees .... In so doing, it eliminates the
geographical and ideological preferences that have dominated our system for the past three
decades." Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1981).
19. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984) (referring to the "conflict in the
Circuits" on the question of the burden of proof).
20. Id. at 407.
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
1184 [Vol. 15:1179
Summer 1994] Refugee Protections and Human Rights Norms
statutory language "would be threatened" to require proof by a
preponderance of the threat to life or freedom. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the
Court ruled that the well-founded fear standard for asylum is lower than
that required of withholding applicants and that it could be met by a
showing of a one in ten likelihood of suffering persecution.22
In Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court engaged in an examina-
tion of the statutory language as well as the legislative history and con-
gressional intent underlying the 1980 Refugee Act's.passage in interpret-
ing the asylum and withholding statutes. In both decisions, the Court
acknowledged Congress' intent to conform United States law to the
1967 Protocol, 23 and looked to the Protocol's structure and language in
interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act.24 The Court accepted guidance from
scholars who had analyzed the meaning of key terms in the 1967 Proto-
col 25 and directed the INS to look also to such appropriate sources. 26
The Court also recognized the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Statu27 as a source of "significant guidance in
construing the Protocol ....28 Overall, the Court's interpretive ap-
22. Id. at 431.
23. "Elimination of the geographic and ideological restrictions ... was thought to bring
the United States' scheme into conformity with its obligations under the Protocol ......
Stevic, 467 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added). "If one thing is clear from the legislative history of
... the entire 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees ...." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436.
24. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 435-44; Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416-28.
25. Articulating a one-in-ten likelihood as sufficient for establishing eligibility, the Court
quoted from A. Grahl-Madsen, a recognized scholar of refugee law. Grahl-Madsen had
written that in a country where it was well-known that every tenth adult was either put to
death or sent to a remote labor camp "it would be only too apparent that anyone who has
managed to escape from the country [would] have [a] 'well-founded fear of being persecuted'
.Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
26. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun directed the INS to draw upon the Protocol's
"rich history of interpretation in international law and scholarly commentaries" in formulating
the well-founded fear standard. Id. at 451.
27. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK]. The Handbook is a publication of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. The U.N. General Assembly established the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter UNHCR] on December 14, 1950. G.A.
Res. 428(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess. (1950), reprinted in GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (1983). Under the Convention and the Protocol, the
UNHCR is charged with the duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Both the Convention and the Protocol require that States
cooperate with the UNHCR, especially in its supervision of the Convention and Protocol's
application. See 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art 35(1); 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, art.
2(1). Pursuant to its supervisory responsibility, the UNHCR prepared the Handbook at the
request of member states for their guidance.
28. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22.
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proach appeared balanced and took into consideration the relevant
international and domestic underpinnings of the 1980 Refugee Act.
C. Controversy Shifts to Meaning of "On Account Of"
The Supreme Court's decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca did
not put to rest controversy regarding the interpretation and application of
the 1980 Refugee Act. Resolution of the question of likelihood of harm
simply shifted the debate to the meaning of the statutory language "on
account of." At issue was the nature of the causal connection required to
establish that the harm was "on account of' the applicant's race, reli-
gion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. Also at issue was the question of the amount and type of evi-
dence required to make the showing of a causal connection between the
harm and the enumerated ground.
1. Intent versus Effects Analysis
In the context of United States jurisprudence, the question of "on
account of' can be seen as essentially a question of intent versus effects
analysis. An intent-based analysis of the phrase "on account of' would
require a showing that the persecutor was motivated to harm the victim
because of the victim's status or beliefs. An effects-based analysis
would allow the victim to prevail upon a showing that he or she suf-
fered because of his or her status or beliefs, whether or not he or she
could prove the persecutor's motivation. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA),29 whose published decisions are precedent for the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service and immigration judges, appeared
to adopt an intent-based analysis almost from the outset.
Campos-Guardado v. INS3° provides a graphic example of the
Board's approach. The applicant in Campos-Guardado was a Salvadoran
woman who had gone to visit her uncle, the chairman of a local agricul-
tural cooperative. During her visit, three individuals arrived at the house
and brutally killed Ms. Campos' uncle and male cousin and then raped
her and her female cousins. Ms. Campos suffered a nervous breakdown
and fled the country after she subsequently ran into one of the as-
sailants, who threatened to kill her if she revealed his identity. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's finding that Ms. Campos
29. The Board of Immigration Appeals [hereinafter BIA] was created by regulation. 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (1990). The jurisdiction of the BIA extends to the review of deportation and
exclusion decisions of immigration judges, including requests for asylum and withholding of
deportation. Id.
30. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
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was ineligible for relief because the harm she had suffered in the past,
or feared in the future, was not on account "of any political opinion she
herself possessed or was believed by the attackers to possess. 31 The
Board's decision in Campos-Guardado was not exceptional but was
consistent with its approach during this time period. 32 The Board's
analytical approach was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Zacarias and
thus continues unchanged to the present.
Decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stood in stark
contrast to those of the Board. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
motivation of the persecutor, the Ninth Circuit examined the beliefs and
motivation of both the persecutor and the victim and the relationship
between the two.33 The Ninth Circuit was more flexible and protection-
oriented in its approach in other ways. For example, the court issued a
landmark ruling that under certain circumstances, neutrality could con-
stitute a political opinion within the meaning of the Refugee Act.34 The
Ninth Circuit also allowed for evidentiary presumptions in favor of the
applicant. For instance, in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,35 the court held that
persecutory acts by a government against a citizen who had engaged in
31. Id. at 288.
32. The Board repeatedly ruled that applicants who suffered severe harm inflicted at the
hands of governmental or opposition forces were not eligible for relief because the motivation
for the infliction of harm was not punishment for political beliefs. In cases where applicants
suspected of antigovernmental activities had been beaten or tortured, the Board denied relief,
characterizing the government's motivation as legitimate governmental investigation. In re
Ayala-Martinez, No. A24 348 629 (BIA Aug. 2, 1988), remanded, Ayala-Martinez v. INS,
914 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Ramirez-Rivas, No. A24 868 155 (BIA Sept. 20, 1988),
rev'd and remanded, Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990). In cases where ap-
plicants feared execution by the guerrillas for desertion, the Board also denied relief,
characterizing the opposition group's motivation as intending to impose a form of military
discipline. In re Maldonado-Cruz, Int. Dec. No. 3041 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1990). For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the Board's analysis in this type of case,
see Carolyn P. Blum, License to Kill: Asylum Law and the Principle of Legitimate
Governmental Authority to "Investigate Its Enemies," 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 719 (1992).
33. In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985), the court stated:
"Persecution" occurs only when there is a difference between the persecutor's
views or status and that of the victim; it is oppression which is inflicted on groups
or individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate .... For
this reason, in determining whether threats or violence constitute political persecu-
tion, it is permissible to examine the motivation of the persecutor; we may look to
the political views and actions of the entity or individual responsible for the threats
or violence, as well as to the victim's, and we may examine the relationship
between the two.
Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
34. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
35. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 509.
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no criminal activity would be presumed to be on account of political
opinion.36
In these and other cases the Ninth Circuit, which heard a substantial
number of asylum claims relative to other circuit courts,37 was blazing a
trail in refugee law. Its decisions were consistently more generous than
the positions advocated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and those adopted in many other circuits. Advocates appreciated the
Ninth Circuit's innovative approach in attempting to provide protection
for individuals who had suffered severe human rights violations. 38 Some
of its more conservative judges decried its approach 39 and regretfully
likened the Ninth Circuit Court to a ship "at some distance from the
main fleet." 4 It was only a matter of time before the jurisprudence of
the Ninth Circuit was challenged in a petition of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The vehicle for such a challenge was the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Zacarias v. INS.4'
36. The Hernandez-Ortiz court observed:
When a government exerts its military strength against an individual or a group
within its population and there is no reason to believe that the individual or group
has engaged in any criminal activity or other conduct that would provide a legiti-
mate basis for governmental action, the most reasonable presumption is that the
government's actions are politically motivated.
Id. at 516.
37. Daniel Compton, Recent Development: Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A
Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar, 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 913 n.6 (1987). ("[T]he Ninth Circuit
has generated a significant portion of these decisions owing to, in large part, the sobering
numbers of Central Americans entering the United States and being apprehended in the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction.").
38. The case of Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), provides an
example of this innovative approach. In Lazo-Majano, the Ninth Circuit characterized the
repeated rape and beating of the applicant, Olimpia Lazo-Majano, by a Salvadoran army
sergeant, as political persecution. The court reached this conclusion by imbuing the actions of
the woman and her tormentor with political content. The army sergeant was asserting "the
political opinion that a man has a right to dominate ...." Id. at 1435. The woman was
expressing the political opinion that the "Armed Force is responsible for lawlessness, rape,
torture and murder. Such views constitute a political opinion. And she has been persecuted for
possessing it. Because she believes that no political control exists to restrain a brutal sergeant
in the Armed Force she has been subjected to his brutality." Id.
39. In his dissent to the Lazo-Majano decision, Judge Poole derisively wrote that "the
majority has outdone Lewis Carroll in its application of the term 'political opinion' and in
finding that male domination in such a personal relationship constitutes political persecution."
Id. at 1437.
40. Mendoza-Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 1990). In his dissent, Judge
Sneed criticized the Ninth Circuit's acceptance of neutrality as political opinion, its rulings
regarding applicant credibility, which discarded a requirement of corroboration, and its
heightened standard of review of decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id.
41. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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D. The Case of Jairo Elias Zacarias
Jairo Elias Zacarias was an indigenous Guatemalan 42 who lived with
his parents in the small town of Olintepeque in the province of Quiche,
Guatemala. In January 1987, when he was eighteen years old, two
guerrillas came to his house and "attempted to persuade him to join
their ranks. 43 He refused to join, and they told him to "think it [over]
well" because they would be back.44 Fearful that they would return and
kill him for refusing to join, he fled Guatemala approximately two
months later, in March of 1987.
Zacarias was arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) upon entering the United States in July of 1987, and applied
for political asylum and withholding of deportation. The immigration
judge denied relief, and was upheld by the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. Consistent with its earlier rulings, the Board held that Zacarias
was ineligible for relief because the motivation of the guerrillas was not
to harm him for his political opinion, but to recruit him.45
The Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA's reasoning, relying on its own
framework, which evaluated the opinions and actions of both the victim
and the persecutor. According to Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, Zacarias
had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
By resisting recruitment, Zacarias was expressing a political opinion
hostile to his would-be persecutors, the guerrillas.46 Furthermore, the
feared persecution was political from the perspective of the guerrillas
because their motives in attempting torecruit him were also political.47
42. The fact that Jairo Elias Zacarias was an indigenous Guatemalan was not raised as a
basis of his claim for asylum. This was an unfortunate strategic decision because the recent
history of genocide and repression against the indigenous Guatemalans, who were perceived
to be guerrilla sympathizers, could have provided the basis for additional theories of persecu-
tion on behalf of the applicant. For an illuminating analysis of theories of persecution in
indigenous Guatemalan cases, see Mel Greenlee, Asylum Policy in Action: The Case of
Guatemala's Kanjobals, 4 LA RAZA L.J. 44 (1991).
43. Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847.
44. Id.
45. The Board referred to its previous ruling where it had held that "when a guerrilla or-
ganization attempted to recruit someone, the initial encounter was important to examine in
order to determine the motivations of the guerrillas. In this case, the guerrillas wanted the
respondent to join them .... In re Zacarias, A27 926 183, slip op. at 4 (BIA Nov. 18,
1988). Therefore, the Board held, it could "hardly be said that the guerrillas ... sought to
harm the respondent for having opinions they found offensive." Id.
46. Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 850.
47. Id.
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The Zacarias decision provided the awaited opportunity for the INS
to challenge developing Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.48 The INS peti-
tioned for, and was granted, certiorari by the Supreme Court. In a
decision remarkable only for its brevity and lack of analytical content,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court
enunciated a rule formally adopting an intent-based analysis. To prevail,
an applicant must demonstrate that the persecutor is motivated to harm
him or her for status or beliefs. According to the Court, Zacarias, who
desired to remain neutral, had failed to prove that he possessed a politi-
cal opinion because neutrality is not "ordinarily ''49 an expression of
political opinion. Furthermore, even if Zacarias had established his
political opinion, he would be required to show further that "the guerril-
las [would] persecute [him] because of that political opinion, rather than
because of his refusal to fight with them, 50 which the Court held he had
not done.
The Court's adoption of an intent requirement effectively accepted
the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals. It is significant,
however, that the Court cast its holding not as one of deference to the
BIA, 5' but as one of straightforward interpretation of the plain meaning
48. The INS was so eager to have the Supreme Court decide the case that it exempted
Zacarias from the immediate benefits of a nationwide class action lawsuit. American Baptist
Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The plaintiffs in Thornburgh
had alleged, inter alia, that the INS had unfairly decided the cases of Salvadoran and
Guatemalan asylum seekers. The negotiated settlement allowed for the termination of pending
proceedings for class members and de novo adjudication under newly established procedures.
Id. For a useful discussion of the settlement, see Carolyn P. Blum, The Settlement of
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central American Asylum
Seekers, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 347 (1991). The INS successfully insisted that Zacarias, and
two other class members, not be permitted their de novo adjudications until their cases were
decided at the level where they were pending. The other two class members were the ap-
plicants in Caflas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1152
(1992), and modified, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992), and In re Pleitez Landos, A24 868 156
(BIA July 20, 1990). The Cafias-Segovia decision is discussed in significant detail infra.
49. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
50. Id.
51. Deference to agency interpretation is appropriate only when the courts are unable to
interpret a statute by "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction .... Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). The
traditional tools include analysis of statutory language, legislative history and congressional
objectives. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1001 (1990) ("In determining
the meaning of a statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the
design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.") If after employing these
traditional means of interpretation, the language at issue is ambiguous, the court may defer to
the agency interpretation of the law, if it is "reasonable." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
In determining the reasonableness of an agency interpretation, the court considers the
consistency with which an interpretation has been applied, whether the interpretation was
contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute, the thoroughness of the agency's con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, and the need for agency expertise in complex techni-
cal areas. See, e.g., NLRB v. Food & Com. Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 124 n.20 (1987) ("We
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of the statute.5z The Court's analysis is questionable, as the statute is
silent on the issue of intent. The dissenting justices also disagreed that
the majority's interpretation was compelled by the plain meaning, ob-
serving that "[t]he statute does not require that an applicant for asylum
prove exactly why his persecutors would act against him .. .
The Zacarias decision is devoid of any rationale other than the
questionable assertion that its ruling is premised on the plain meaning of
the statute. The majority chose to ignore other sources that could have
informed its interpretation, including international interpretation of the
1967 Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform United States
refugee law. The dissent castigates the majority for departing from its
approach in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,5 4 which had reviewed the Act's
legislative history and acknowledged the significance of the 1967 Proto-
col 55 in interpreting key statutory language. This blindness to interna-
also consider the consistency with which an agency interpretation has been applied, and
whether the interpretation was contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute being
construed. ... ); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 431 (1985) (noting that the
agency's definition of a statutory term had been "developed and interpreted ... for many
years within the framework of the complex statutory scheme .... and thus it was entitled to
considerable deference); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 134 (1985) (affirmed
agency's position, and noted that "we are not dealing with an agency's change of position
with the advent of a different administration, but rather with EPA's consistent interpretation
since the 1970s .... ). The Court rejected the INS' argument for heightened deference to
agency interpretation in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca because of the "inconsistency of the
positions the BIA has taken through the years." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n.30.
For an illuminating critique of judicial deference to INS decisions, see Kevin R. John-
son, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993).
52. The Court explicitly stated that it was relying upon the plain language of the statute
in reaching its decision:
In construing statutes, we must, of course, start with the assumption that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used ...
The ordinary meaning of the phrase "persecution on account of ... political
opinion" in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,
not the persecutor's .... The statute makes motive critical ....
Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816-17 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 820.
54. "The narrow, grudging construction of the concept of 'political opinion' that the
Court adopts today is inconsistent with the basic approach to this statute that the Court
endorsed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca .... Id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Justice Stevens excerpted a lengthy passage from the Cardoza-Fonseca decision,
including the following:
Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Na-
tions Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion that to
show a 'well-founded fear of persecution,' an alien need not prove that it is more
likely than not that he or she will be persecuted ....
Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 818-19, (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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tional precedent is all the more troubling given the paucity of a reasoned
analysis supporting the majority's decision,56 and leads one to question
the motivation of the jurists. It is certainly plausible that the majority was
less concerned with interpreting "on account of' with reference to
congressional intent and the meaning of the 1967 Protocol than in
narrowing the definition of refugee - a result advocated by the Executive,
through its delegates in the INS and the BIA. The Court's decision is
consistent with its own trend of limiting the protection afforded through
constitutional and statutory provisions by requiring proof of intent, rather
than effects. Regardless of the motivation of the Zacarias majority, the
results remain the same - an increased burden of proof for refugee
applicants.
The Zacarias decision cannot be justified by the language of the statute,
considered in light of congressional intent to interpret the Act consistently
with the 1967 Protocol. The predominant purpose of the 1967 Protocol
is humanitarian, and it should be interpreted "in a way which is consistent
with its object and purpose. 57 While proof of intent would certainly be
appropriate if a goal of the refugee regime were punishment of persecutors,
it is of little relevance in a system whose focus is protection. For this
reason, as discussed below, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) itself has recommended against the imposition of an
intent requirement, 58 advice which the Court chose to disregard. As
reviewed in Section V, there are numerous precedents drawn from other
areas of U.S. jurisprudence where the requirement of proof of intent has
been modified to accommodate overriding policy objectives. Examples of
this are relaxation of proof of intent in the criminal area and the
development of strict liability in tort law.
Aside from the fact that inquiry into the persecutor's motive is
inconsistent with the purposes of the 1967 Protocol, there is another
concern regarding this requirement - the almost impossible evidentiary
56. The Chairperson of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, R.G.L. Fairweather,
criticized the Supreme Court's decision for its' seeming contempt for international precedent and
for the decisions of other countries: "In these days of global interdependence perhaps even the
Supreme Court might benefit from looking at how courts and refugee boards in like-minded
countries have decided similar cases ...." Fairweather noted that the majority decision in
Zacarias failed to "cite a single international precedent, judicial or academic" in reaching its
conclusion. R.G.L. Fairweather, Political Persecution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1992, at A24.
57. Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees-Some Basic Questions, Report by the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International
Protection, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 19th Mtg., at 8, U.N.
Doc. EC/1992/SCP/CRP. 10 (1992) [hereinafter Implementation].
58. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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burden imposed upon the applicant. Pursuant to Zacarias, the applicant
must provide some proof "direct or circumstantial" 9 of the persecutor's
motivation. Proof of intent, or state of mind, is difficult under any
circumstances. In the case of refugees, it is exceedingly difficult. Generally,
the refugee is thousands of miles away from the place where the relevant
events took place.6° The refugee does not have subpoena power over his
or her persecutors, nor does the refugee have access to other in-
strumentalities available in normal civil or criminal proceedings in the
United States. Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit has observed, the matter
is complicated by the fact that "[p]ersecutors are hardly likely to provide
their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution." 6' The
requirement that the applicant prove persecutor's motivation places the
burden upon the party who does not have access to the critical information.
This requirement runs counter to the wisdom that "a determination of which
party should bear the burden of proof of a particular fact should be based
on such common sense considerations. as which party has access to the
underlying information and which party is arguing from a disadvantaged
position." 62
The Court's decision in Zacarias is consistent with a longer trend
towards limiting the protection of individual rights afforded under
constitutional and statutory provisions by imposing an intent rather than
an effects analysis. The Court's recent decision in Oregon v. Smith,63 which
dealt a blow to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion,
is an example of this approach. Congress has seen fit to remedy the damage
of Oregon v. Smith through enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993.
59. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 817.
60. The Handbook addresses the issue of difficulty of proof:
It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting
a claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his statements by
documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence
of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person
fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very
frequently even without personal documents.
HANDBOOK, supra note 27 at 47, 196. (emphasis added).
61. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
62. H.R. Rep. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1990).
63. Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND
POLICY OBJECTIVES
A. Plain Language and Congressional Intent
The decision in Zacarias holds that the statutory phrase "on account
of" requires proof of the persecutor's motivation. The majority based this
ruling on the plain meaning of the statute. Notwithstanding the Court's
reading, the relevant language "on account of' does not require proof of
intent. The dictionary simply defines the phrase "on account of" as meaning
"for the sake of, by reason of, because of."64 The plain language - "on
account of' - requires a causal connection between the feared persecution
and the race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion of the
victim. The requirement of a causal connection does not, however, logically
translate into proof of persecutor's motivation. On the contrary, the phrase
''on account of' is sufficiently open-ended to permit eligibility to victims
who suffer harm as a result of a protected status or belief, regardless of
the persecutor's specific intent.
Proof of intent has not been requisite under various anti-discrimination
statutes containing language similar to the Refugee Act's "on account of."
The Equal Pay Act of 1963,65 which prohibits discrimination "on the basis
of sex," considers the effects of the employer's actions rather than the
intent.66 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 67 which makes it unlawful to
discriminate or adversely affect an individual "because of" race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, can be satisfied either by a showing of
intent or effects. The varying interpretation of similar statutory language
leaves open to question the assertion that the plain meaning of "on account
of' compels an intent requirement.
Beyond the language of the statute, the legislative history of the 1980
Refugee Act does not support the Court's interpretation. Congress did not
intend a rigid motive-based interpretation of the legislation, but con-
templated a more elastic reading of the statutory language. The legislative
history notes that a purpose of the Act was to give the United States
64. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 13 (1961).
65. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
66. Hassman v. Valley Motors, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 564 (D. Md. 1992); Tidwell v. Fort
Howard Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1487 (E.D. Okla. 1992); Strecker v. Grand Forks Social Service
Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 99 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("The Equal Pay Act creates a type of strict
liability; no intent to discriminate need be shown.").
67. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993).
1194 [Vol. 15:1179
Summer 19941 Refugee Protections and Human Rights Norms
sufficient flexibility to deal with refugee crises.68 Requiring applicants to
prove intent restricts, rather than provides, flexibility in the adjudication
of these claims.
The fact that Congress intended to bring the United States into
compliance with the 1967 Protocol and expected that the Act would be
interpreted consistently with the 1967 Protocol provides a substantial
basis for rejecting a proof of motivation requirement. The 1967 Protocol
expresses the causal connection between the feared harm and the vic-
tim's status or belief by the phrase "for reasons of"'69 The phrase "for
reasons of' is sufficiently broad to permit a finding of causal relation-
ship absent proof of the persecutor's motivation. In addition, the U.N.
Handbook, which the Court itself recognized as a source of significant
guidance in interpreting the 1967 Protocol, notes the difficulty ap-
plicants may have in even identifying the reasons for which they may be
persecuted. 0 Significantly, Congress was aware of the Handbook when
it enacted the 1980 Refugee Act and in all likelihood intended the
standards within it to serve as an interpretive guide to the 1980 Refugee
Act.7
1
In addition to the guidance contained in the Handbook, the UNHCR
has counseled against an intent requirement on other occasions, includ-
ing its Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Zacarias case. In its brief, the UNHCR argued that an intent require-
ment is misplaced because "refugee status examiners are not called upon
to decide the criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor, and refugee
status is not dependent on such proof. ' 72 The Amicus Curiae brief
quotes a 1990 UNHCR memorandum sent to field officers as instruction
in the proper determination of refugee status. The memorandum directs
68. 126 CONG. REC. 4499 (1980).
69. 1967 Protocol, supra note 10, art. I(a)(2) (emphasis added).
70. The U.N. Handbook directly addresses the issue of the required nexus between
persecution and the applicant's status or opinion in two paragraphs. First, the Handbook notes
that "[o]ften the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared.
It is not, however, his duty to analyse his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in
detail." HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 66 (emphasis added). In the reference that deals with
political persecution, the Handbook acknowledges that "it may not always be possible to
establish a causal link between the opinion expressed and the related measures suffered or
feared by the applicant." Id. 81.
71. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 321 n.6 (4th Cir. 1990) (Winter, J., dissent-
ing).
72. Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in
support of Respondent at 16, Zacarias v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342).
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against a requirement of proof of intent "[a]s long as persecution or fear
of it . . . [is] related to the grounds given in the definition. 73
In a July 1992 report,74 the Executive Committee of the UNHCR
addressed issues concerning implementation of the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol and specifically focused on the question of proof of
intent, which it identified as a source of concern.
Th[is] Office has been particularly concerned about a number
of recent cases involving individual refugee status applicants whose
claims have been denied .... Even where it has been accepted by
the determining authorities that an individual has suffered serious
human rights abuses, that he or she has a genuine fear and that
there is a distinct likelihood of arrest and detention on return, the
position has been taken that these factors are not attributable to any
intention on the part of the authorities to persecute the individual
concerned on account of one of the recognized grounds and that,
accordingly, there is no issue of refugee status involved.75
The United States is not bound by the Handbook, or by other UN-
HCR recommendations. Nonetheless, given congressional intent to
conform United States law to the 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR's guidance
is useful and relevant.76 The Supreme Court's failure even to consider
73. The full quotation is as follows:
The definition [of refugee] does not require that there must be a specific showing
that the authorities intend to persecute an individual on account of [one of the five
factors]. As long as persecution or fear of it may be related to the grounds given in
the definition, it is irrelevant whether the [persecutor] intended to persecute. It is
the result which matters.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva), Inter-Office
Memorandum/Field Office Memorandum (unnumbered) (March I, 1990), reprinted in
UNHCR Amicus Curiae Brief at 15, Zacarias (No. 90-1342). The UNHCR also argued this
same point in its Amicus Curiae Brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cafias-Segovia
v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 88-7444), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992),
partially rev'd, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992). At issue in Caiias-Segovia was the proper
interpretation of "persecution on account of religion." The UNHCR declared that "an 'intent
to persecute' on the part of a government or other state authority is not a necessary precondi-
tion for the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution ...." Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioners at 4,
5, Cahas-Segovia (No. 88-7444).
74. Implementation, supra note 57.
75. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
76. As noted in Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court identified the Handbook as a
significant source of interpretive guidance. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438. The Board of
Immigration Appeals and the federal courts have consistently referred to the Handbook in
interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act. Id. at 439. See also Barraza-Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443,
1451 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990), quoting Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (9th Cir.
1985) (noting that the Handbook is consulted for "assistance in understanding many concepts
related to our immigration laws."); Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868 n.3 (9th Cir.
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the Handbook as a source of interpretive authority undermines the
credibility of the Zacarias decision.
B. History of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
The definition of "refugee" in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col, which was incorporated into the 1980 Refugee Act, had its origins
in the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).77
The United Nations created the IRO in 1946 to address the refugee
crisis precipitated by World War II. The IRO was conceived to be an
organization "of limited duration to deal with what was expected to be a
temporary problem. 78 The IRO Constitution was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in December 194679 and "contained the most detailed
definition of a refugee drawn up during [this] era."'80 Developed to
address World War II refugees, the IRO Constitution applied only to
certain categories of persons.8' Pursuant to the IRO Constitution, a
refugee was defined as an individual in any of the specified categories
who "expressed valid objections"82 to returning to his or her country of
nationality or residence. A valid objection could be established by a
showing of past persecution or a fear of persecution because of race,
.1990) (quoting from its earlier decision noting that the Handbook "was 'particularly sig-
nificant' in analyzing asylum and withholding of deportation cases"); Turcios v. INS, 821
F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the Handbook to evaluate petitioner's credibility);
Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the Handbook to find that
provision regarding crimes committed outside the United States does not apply to crimes
committed within the United States); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985)
(applying the Handbook provisions on the definition of social group).
77. The Constitution of the International Refugee Organization was adopted as a resolu-
tion of the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res. 62 at 97, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1947)
[hereinafter IRO Constitution]. See also James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status
in International Law: 1920-1950, 33 INT'L & COmp. L.Q. 348 (1984), for an excellent
discussion of the IRO definition, and the international legal accords which preceded it. Other
useful discussions of the historical antecedents to the 1980 Refugee Act include Theodore
Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted," The Sources and Application of A Criterion
of Refugee Status, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 333 (1984); Barry Sautman, The Meaning of "Well-
Founded Fear of Persecution" in United States Asylum Law and in International Law, 9
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 483 (1986).
78. Cox, supra note 77, at 337-38. "It was initially thought that the IRO could ac-
complish its work by 1950." Id. at 338 n.26.
79. IRO Constitution, supra note 77.
80. Hathaway, supra note 77, at 374.
81. "Included were the victims of Nazism, Fascism, and similar regimes, pre-war
refugees, persons outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to avail themselves
of its protection, war orphans and displaced persons." Id. at 375 (footnotes omitted).
82. An exception to the "valid objections" requirement was made on behalf of "Spanish
Republican refugees and Germans and Austrians who were detainees or returnees during the
Nazi era." Id. at 374 n.278.
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religion, nationality, or political opinion.83 A valid objection could also
be established by demonstrating political disagreement or dissent to the
regime in power.84
Commentators have remarked upon the generous parameters of the
IRO definition. "The basic notion.., underlying the IRO definition was
that an individual who might be described as a victim of state in-
tolerance or as a genuinely motivated political dissident was a refugee
.... During the drafting of the IRO definition, the United States and
its allies were among those groups advocating such a generous defini-
tion; they "argued strongly that individuals had the right to choose to
migrate in search of personal freedom. 86
The IRO provided the original point of reference for the 1951
Convention.87 The U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
appointed a committee, the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and
Related Problems, to "provide for an instrument for the protection of
refugees to be available when IRO terminated." 8 The representatives of
thirteen nations participated in the drafting, and their task "was to devise
a definition of the term refugee which would provide protection to the
greatest number of persons while remaining politically acceptable to the
majority of States. '89 The countries that ultimately drafted the 1951
Convention were predominantly Western, 9° and the 1951 Convention
reflects European political objectives and values.9 ' Persons "who feared
ipersecution' in the sense of being denied basic civil and political rights
would fall within the international mandate."'92 The Preamble to the 1951
83. Id. at 375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 376.
86. Id. at 374.
87. "The origin of the Protocol's definition of 'refugee' is found in the 1946 Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437. See also Cox,
supra note 77, at 343 ("Committee members were in general agreement that the IRO defini-
tion was to serve as the point of departure in drafting the definition article for the Conven-
tion.").
88. Sautman, supra note 77, at 531.
89. Cox, supra note 77, at 343. For a detailed discussion of the drafting of the Conven-
tion, see id. at 342-52; Sautman, supra note 77, at 531-37; James C. Hathaway, A Recon-
sideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (1990).
90. The governments of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Republic of China, Denmark,
France, Israel, Poland, Turkey, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela were appointed to the Ad Hoc Committee. Cox,
supra note 77, at 342. The Polish and Soviet representatives left he first meeting of the
committee in protest over the issue of China's representation, and never returned to participate
further. Id. at 342-43.
91. Hathaway, supra note 89, at 148-49.
92. Id. at 149.
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Convention articulates a broad commitment to the protection of "fu-
ndamental rights and freedoms" as defined in the U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.93
In various respects, the 1951 Convention definition of refugee was
broader in scope than the IRO. The IRO contained four grounds as the
bases of persecution: race, religion, nationality, and political opinion.
The Convention added a fifth ground, that of persecution because of
"membership of a particular social group., 94 A. Grahl-Madsen, a scholar
whose expertise in this area is well recognized, has referred to the social
group category as having a "broader application than the combined
notions of racial, ethnic, and religious groups. 9 5 Its inclusion, according
to Grahl-Madsen, was "to stop a possible gap" in the scope of the 1951
Convention's coverage.96
Significantly, the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights served as reference points for the 1951 Convention. Both
instruments came into existence in the wake of World War II, and were
part of a framework that forms the basis of the contemporary interna-
tional human rights system.97 The Charter and the Declaration set forth
those human rights and fundamental freedoms which governments are
required to secure for individuals within their jurisdictions.98 Nothing in
the U.N. Charter or Universal Declaration incorporates an intent require-
93. The Convention Preamble begins:
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have
affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and
freedoms without discrimination,
Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its
profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms ....
1951 Convention, supra note 11, pmbl.
94. Id. art. I(a)(2).
95. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
(1966).
96. Id. See also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 136 n.9 (1991).
"[T]he history of the cognizable categories of persecution illustrates that they were intended
to serve a liberal purpose, by creating a universally applicable and acceptable standard to
replace ad hoc, situational responses to disparate refugee crises." Id. (quoting Donald P.
Gagliardi, The Inadequacy of Cognizable Grounds of Persecution as a Criterion for Accord-
ing Refugee Status, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 267-68 (1987-1988)); Austin T. Fragomen, Jr.,
The Refugee: A Problem of Definition, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 45, 54 (1970) ("The
grounds of persecution set forth by the Convention are sufficiently broad so that the major
grounds for discrimination or oppression have been included.").
97. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15 (1983).
98. Id.
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ment upon the individual asserting. that her fundamental human rights
have been violated; recourse is not conditioned upon proof of the State's
intent to violate.
The 1951 Refugee Convention was informed by these international
instruments and was part of the emerging framework developed in
response to World War II. Viewed in this context, it is highly unlikely
that the Convention's drafters intended that victims of human rights
violations be required to prove their persecutor's intent in order to
establish refugee status. Such a requirement would have been incon-
sistent with developing international human rights norms and would
have subverted the humanitarian purpose of the refugee protection
regime.
III. BURDEN OF PROOF & SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Burden of Proof
The asylum applicant bears the burden of proof as to the prima facie
elements of her case.99 The term "burden of proof' encompasses both
burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion of the
factfinder.'0° The Zacarias decision impacted both the burden of produc-
tion and of persuasion. Zacarias assigned the burden of production of
evidence of persecutor's intent to the applicant, who must provide
"some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial."' 0 The Court in Zacarias
99. 8 C.FR. § 208.13(a) (1990) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to
establish that he is a refugee as defined in Section 1 101(a)(42) of the Act."). The assignment
of the burden of proof to the applicant is consistent with the general rule that the party who
brings a claim has the burden of proof to establish the requisite facts. See CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341 (Edward W. Cleary ed.) (3d ed. 1984). See
also HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 196 ("It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof
lies on the person submitting the claim.").
100. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5 (3d ed.
1985). The burden of production is the duty of a party to come forward with evidence to
prove a particular fact. The burden of persuasion refers to the degree of certainty to which a
fact-finder must be persuaded. Id. Professor Robert Belton has distinguished burden of proof
from burden of persuasion as follows:
The term "burden of proof' has two independent meanings. On the one hand, it is
used to denote the degree to which a factfinder must be subjectively persuaded -
based upon the evidence presented - that a particular fact is more likely true than
not. On the other hand, the term may refer to the duty of a party to come forward
with evidence to prove a particular fact. This duty initially is allocated to the party
seeking a change in the status quo, usually the plaintiff in a civil case or the
prosecutor in a criminal case.
Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1206 n.3 (1981) (citations omitted).
101. INS v. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1992).
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implicitly dealt with the burden of persuasion by acquiescing in the
Board's approach to adjudicating it.10 2 The Board's decision in Zacarias,
as well as in numerous other cases, imposed a prohibitively high burden
of persuasion on the applicant regarding proof of the persecutor's
motivation, which the Court affirmed.
Professor Robert Belton, author of a classic article addressing bur-
den of proof in discrimination cases,'0 3 remarked upon the degree to
which rules regarding the burden of proof affect the ultimate outcome of
cases. 1°4 Professor Belton noted that judges were able to do an end run
around substantive law principles with which they disagreed through the
application of burden of proof principles." 5
Professor Belton's observations in the context of discrimination
jurisprudence are equally true in the context of refugee law. The
Zacarias decision substantially diluted the Supreme Court's generous
decision in Cardoza-Fonseca. Cardoza-Fonseca provided that an ap-
plicant who feared a one in ten possibility of persecution could meet the
well-founded fear standard. Zacarias all but nullified Cardoza-Fonseca
by requiring the applicant to produce evidence of the persecutor's intent,
and by deferring to the Board's adjudication of whether the applicant
had met her burden of proof on the intent issue. The decision in
Zacarias has also had the effect of increasing the burden for withhold-
ing claims which had been established earlier by the Court in Stevic.
The decision accomplished this by allowing the Board to impose a level
of proof far higher than the preponderance standard established in Stevic
on the issue of proof of intent.
102. The Supreme Court held in Zacarias that the Board of Immigration Appeals could
be reversed only if the evidence presented by the applicant was "so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." Zacarias, 112 S. Ct.
at 817. By adopting such a deferential standard of review, the Court was essentially acquiesc-
ing in the Board's approach..
103. Belton, supra note 100.
104. Professor Belton observed:
A review of the discrimination cases also suggests that the burden of proof issue
may well be the battleground upon which some judges are attempting to repudiate
the disparate impact theory of discrimination. A court may be hesitant to repudiate
outright well-established substantive theories of liability, even when there is a
belief that these theories are misguided. As a result, a court instead may adopt
procedural rules designed to achieve effectively the same result.
Id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
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1. Burden of Production
Zacarias interpreted the statutory language "on account of' to
require proof of the persecutor's motivation; henceforth intent is part of
the prima facie case for which the asylum seeker bears the burden of
proof. The applicant must produce evidence and persuade the decision-
maker on the issue of the persecutor's motivation.
The requirement that the applicant provide evidence of the persecu-
tor's intent is troubling because the refugee applicant is in a particularly
disadvantaged position regarding proof of the persecutor's intent. The
fact that the Court ruled that the evidence may be "direct or circumstan-
tial" is of minor import in the face of the inherent difficulties for the
asylum seeker.
Even under the best of circumstances, the motivation and state of
mind of another individual are difficult to ascertain and even more
difficult to prove. In the refugee context, various factors unique to the
asylum seeker's situation compound this problem. First, the events at
issue occurred in a different venue, thousands of miles away. Not in-
frequently, acts of persecution occur during situations of war and civil
strife, which involve complex historical and political factors. The victim
may not know the exact motivation of his or her persecutor, nor, as the
Ninth Circuit remarked, are persecutors "likely to provide their victims
with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution."' 6 The persecutor
can neither be put on the stand and questioned as to his motivation nor
deposed or required to answer interrogatories. Because the relevant
events took place far away from the present venue, witnesses with
personal knowledge will likely be unavailable to testify. Thus, evidence
of intent - direct or circumstantial - is exceedingly difficult to obtain.
The Handbook recognizes the inherent difficulties of proof, and al-
though it accepts the general rule that the applicant bears the burden of
proof, 107 it notes that "in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use
all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in sup-
port of the application."
' 10 8
Under these circumstances, the requirement that the applicant pro-
duce evidence of the persecutor's intent offends notions of fairness,
which look to the likelihood that "evidence on a particular element may
106. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 196.
108. Id.
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lie more within the knowledge or control of one party than
another .... 19
2. Burden of Persuasion
The BIA's approach to the applicant's burden of persuasion on the
issue of intent compounds the difficulty of meeting the requisite bur-
den.°"0 The Board has required proof which exceeds the standards estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca.
In Stevic, the Court interpreted the statutory language "life or free-
dom would be threatened on -account of' to require proof by a
preponderance. Proof by a preponderance is the most common standard
in civil cases and has been described as proof that leads the factfinder to
believe that the "existence of a fact is more probable than its nonex-
istence.""' Thus, withholding applicants must establish that persecution
on account of an enumerated ground is more likely than not. In Car-
doza-Fonseca, the Court turned to the statutory language "well-founded
fear of persecution on account of . . ." and held that it did not require
that persecution be more likely than not. A fear could be well-founded if
it were a "reasonable possibility."'' 2
Neither the higher preponderance standard nor the more generous
well-founded fear standard requires the applicant to prove with absolute
certainty the elements of her claim, including the persecutor's intent. An
applicant for withholding of deportation is simply required to establish
that it is more likely than not that the persecutor is motivated by one of
the enumerated factors, while an applicant for asylum need only show a
reasonable possibility of the same. Neither of these standards requires
109. Belton, supra note 100, at 1218.
110. Professor C.M.A. McCauliff has explained the concept of burden of persuasion and
its relationship to degrees of belief as follows:
When people take their disputes to court, or the state prosecutes an alleged of-
fender for a crime, what has happened in the past must be determined. Determi-
nations of past events, however, cannot recreate those events with perfect knowl-
edge .... As a result of this lack of certainty about what happened, it is inescap-
able that the trier's conclusions be based on probabilities. In other words, because
the trier of fact never can be absolutely certain that a particular fact is true, the
parties only can persuade him to a particular degree of certainty that the fact is
probably true .... Once the trier of fact makes a decision in accordance with the
required probability ("beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evi-
dence," or "preponderance of the evidence"), the finding is "true" for the purposes
of entering judgment and settling the dispute with finality.
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof" Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitution-
al Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295-96 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
11. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 100, § 7.6.
112. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
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the applicant to establish that there are no other possible explanations.
Such a requirement is more akin to the criminal "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard.
Nonetheless, the Board has effectively applied a standard .far more
rigorous than a preponderance to claims for both political asylum and
withholding of deportation with respect to the issue of proof of the
persecutor's intent. As detailed below, the Board has refused to accept
the applicant's proffered explanation of the persecutor's motivation if
there are any other alternative explanations. The Board's adjudication, in
effect, imposes a beyond a reasonable doubt standard insofar as it denies
the asylum seeker's claim if there is any reasonable doubt regarding the
persecutor's motivation.
The Board's application of an exceedingly high burden of persua-
sion must be evaluated in the context of policy considerations related to
the question of the burden of persuasion. It is well recognized that the
varying burdens of persuasion reflect societal values regarding the
consequences of a possible erroneous decision. The difference between
the burden of persuasion in civil and criminal cases reflects these values.
In a civil case, "a mistaken judgment for the plaintiff is no worse than a
mistaken judgment for the defendant.""' 3 Therefore, the burden of per-
suasion is proof by a preponderance. In criminal cases, "society has
judged that it is significantly worse for an innocent man to be found
guilty ... than for a guilty man to go free"" 4 and the prosecutor must
persuade the factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Within this
framework, the defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt to defeat a conviction." 5 The Supreme Court has explicitly af-
firmed the relationship between the interest at stake and the application
of the reasonable doubt standard: "[w]here one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value - as a criminal defendant his liberty -
this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on
113. MCCORMICK, supra note 99, § 341.
114. Id.
115. Id.
[A] lawsuit is essentially a search for probabilities. A margin of error must be an-
ticipated in any such search. Mistakes will be made and in a civil case a mistaken
judgment for the plaintiff is no worse than a mistaken judgment for the defendant.
However, this is not the case in a criminal action. Society has judged that it is sig-
nificantly worse for an innocent man to be found guilty of a crime than for a guilty
man to go free. The consequences to the life, liberty, and good name of the ac-
cused from an erroneous conviction of a crime are usually more serious than the
effects of an erroneous judgment in a civil case.
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the other party the burden ... of persuading the fact-finder at the con-
clusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
' 16
For this very reason the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca adopted a stan-
dard less rigorous than proof by a preponderance in asylum cases. The
Court observed that "[d]eportation is always a harsh measure; it is all
the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or
she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or
her home country ... Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for
[asylum] to those who could prove it is more likely than not that they
will be persecuted if deported."
'' 17
The following decisions of the Board demonstrate that although the
Board gives lip service to the well-founded fear and clear probability
standards, it imposes a burden of persuasion of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt on the issue of persecutor's motivation.
B. Application of the Burden of Proof: In re Konesan,
In re Thanapalan, In re R-
Three post-Zacarias decisions, In re Konesan,"18 In re Than-
apalan,"9 and In Re R-,120 demonstrate the Board's application of an
inappropriate burden of persuasion. In all three cases the applicants
suffered various forms of torture' 2' and yet were found ineligible for
relief. The Board ruled the applicants ineligible because they had failed
to show that the torture was on account of an enumerated ground.
Beyond the relevance of these decisions to the evidentiary issue, these
cases have an even more disturbing significance. They stand for the
116. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
117. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449-50.
118. In re Konesan, A29 637 308, slip op. (BIA June 11, 1992).
119. In re Thanapalan, A28 464 467, slip op. (BIA Oct. 13, 1992).
120. In re R-, Int. Dec. No. 3195 (BIA Dec. 15, 1992), remanded sub nom. Rana v.
Moshorak, No. CV-93-0274 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 1993).
121. This article adopts the definition of torture set forth in the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. ESCOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 Annex, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1984/72, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987). Article I of the Convention defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, where such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
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proposition that a victim of official state torture 22 is not a refugee
within the meaning of United States law. This result reinforces the
argument that something is amiss with United States refugee jurispru-
dence.
The applicant in In re Konesan, a Tamil Sri Lankan, was arrested on
four occasions by the Sri Lankan Army, and on one occasion by the
Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) and the Elam People's Revolutionary
Liberation Front (EPRLF). During these detentions, which ranged from
several days to several weeks, Shantini Konesan was tortured and inter-
rogated about her knowledge of the opposition group, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The Board's decision describes her
capture and the treatment she suffered on one occasion:
The applicant worked as a teacher. She was taking a bus to work
one morning when the bus came to a sudden halt .... Members of
the Sri Lankan army boarded the bus and shot randomly at the
passengers, most of whom were Tamil; the applicant was injured
by flying shrapnel and one of her friends was killed. The applicant
was taken to Jaffna Fort, an army camp. At this camp, the army
kept her in a dark room, beat her on the leg with plastic pipes,
applied chili powder to her eyes, and questioned her concerning
her suspected ties to the LTTE. Following this beating, the ap-
plicant's legs were swollen and she was unable to walk.123
In addition to the five captures that Shantini Konesan herself suffered,
her brother was arrested and tortured on four occasions, her sister on at
least one, and their house was bombed and destroyed. The applicant was
also fearful of the LTTE who wanted her and her family to "join their
ranks." 1
24
In denying Shantini Konesan's claim to asylum, the Board cited
Zacarias and "ruled that none of these incidents constituted political
persecution. The Sri Lankan Army, according to the Board, was moti-
vated by a desire to "investigate a suspected security concern and to
gain information about the LTTE."'' 25 The Board ruled the same regard-
ing the IPKF and the EPRLF. The Board held that although the
"methods employed" by these groups in interrogating the applicant were
122. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined state torture as "acts of torture
performed by or under the direction of government officials." Siderman de Blake v. Republic
of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 n.14 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Konesan, supra note 118, at 2.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 10.
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"to be condemned,"' 2 6 the harm she suffered was not political persecu-
tion. To prove political persecution, the Board concluded, one "must do
more than merely show ... civil rights or human rights violations."'
2 7
The applicant in In re Thanapalan was also a Tamil Sri Lankan
suspected of sympathizing with the LTTE. On occasion he had met the
LTTE's demands for food and cigarettes when they came to his grocery
store. He was arrested by the Indian Peacekeeping Forces and accused
of assisting the LTTE. During this detention, as the Board decision
recounts, he "was severely beaten by elements of the Eelam People's
Revolutionary Liberation Front ("EPRLF") ... suffer[ing] a broken nose
and lacerations to his body."'' 2 Subsequently the LTTE insisted that he
collaborate with them, and he complied, becoming a process server for
a mediation office the LTTE had created. He complied until the Sri
Lankan military reasserted itself in his area, after which he decided to
leave, going first to another region within Sri Lanka and then fleeing the
country. 
29
After a lengthy discussion of the background to the conflict in Sri
Lanka, the Board ruled that neither the mistreatment Thanapalan had
suffered in the past nor the harm he feared in the future came within the
protection of the 1980 Refugee Act. According to the Board, his deten-
tion and beating by the IPKF and EPRLF could not constitute political
or ethnic persecution, because these two groups, were sympathetic to
Tamil political demands, although opposed to the tactics of the LTTE,
which included acts of "violence and terror."'' 30 Therefore, Thanapalan's
mistreatment resulted from his suspected allegiance to the LTTE, not his
political views or ethnicity. This mistreatment of Thanapalan, which the
Board characterizes as a possible act of "revenge" in response to LTTE
terrorism, is "in the nature of a civil war... [and] does not amount to
persecution within the meaning of the Act."'
' 3
'
In re R- involved a Sikh from the state of Punjab in India. Members
of the All India Sikh Student Federation had come to his home request-
ing collaboration. This contact was reported to the local police, who
"arrested him as a suspected militant."'' 32 He was interrogated about the
group that had visited his house and was subjected to torture, including
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Thanapalan, supra note 119, at 2.
129. Id. at 2-3.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 8.
132. In re R-, supra note 120, at 3.
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"having his arms and legs stretched, being stripped and whipped with a
leather belt, being beaten with batons, and being denied food."' 33 The
Sikh militants returned, beat him, and threatened him with death if he
did not assist them. He was beaten again by the police three months
before he decided to flee India.
The Board denied relief, finding that neither the Sikh militants nor
the police had the intent to persecute him for one of the enumerated
grounds. As to the Sikh militants, the Board found "no persuasive
evidence, direct or circumstantial,"' 13 4 that their motives were political
rather than in response to his refusal to assist them. Likewise the torture
by the local police was not political persecution because it was motivat-
ed by an intent "to extract information about Sikh militants,"' 135 not to
harm him for his political opinion.
In her partial concurrence to In re R-, Board member Mary Maguire
Dunne criticized the Board for its improper adjudication of the ap-
plicant's burden of persuasion:
[A]n alien does not bear the unreasonable burden of establishing
the exact motivation of a persecutor where different grounds for
actions are possible. In this light, I find improper the majority's
confident conclusion that the persecution suffered by the applicant
at the hands of the Indian police was not premised upon one of the
protected grounds.
In reality, the majority employs a standard diametrically opposed to
that set forth in Matter of Fuentes ... by implicitly suggesting
that an alien must prove a persecutorial motivation anchored upon
one of the enumerated grounds to the exclusion of all other pos-
sible motivations. Matter of Fuentes .. .recognized that there can
be more than one possible basis for a persecutor's actions. The task
of the alien is simply to demonstrate the reasonableness of a moti-
vation which is related to one of the enumerated grounds. Con-
comitantly, it is irrelevant whether the majority's interpretation of
the events is reasonable; the proper focus is whether the applicant's
interpretation is reasonable.'36
Board member Dunne implicitly affirms Cardoza-Fonseca and
rejects key aspects of Zacarias. Dunne's comment that the applicant
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id. at 12-13.
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need only demonstrate the reasonableness of the persecutor's motivation
comes directly from Cardoza-Fonseca.'37 Her assertion that the reason-
ableness of the Board's interpretation is "irrelevant" is a direct rejection
of Zacarias to the extent that the Court in Zacarias insulated "reason-
able" decisions of the Board from judicial reversal.'38 Dunne's com-
ments highlight the Board's distortion of the well-founded fear standard,
a distortion that was ratified by the highly deferential standard of review
articulated in Zacarias. This deferential standard to the Board's adjudi-
cation has had the result of saddling the applicant with the burden of
proving his persecutor's intent ,beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden
which was not intended by the Convention or the 1980 Refugee Act.'39
C. Substantive Implications: Torture Victims Excluded
from the Act's Protection
Although cases such as In re R- are troubling for their evidentiary
rulings, they are far more disturbing for their far-reaching substantive
implications. In re R-, In re Konesan, and In re Thanapalan stand for
the alarming proposition that victims of torture were not intended to be
beneficiaries of the 1980 Refugee Act. This appalling conclusion cannot
be squared with any meaningful- understanding of the purpose of the
domestic and international refugee regime.
137. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court held:
As we pointed out in Stevic, a moderate interpretation of the 'well-founded fear'
standard would indicate 'that so long as an objective situation is established by the
evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution,
but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
138. The Court held that in order to obtain judicial reversal, the applicant in Zacarias
would have to show "that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable
fact-finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 817.
139. Notwithstanding the deference accorded to the Board, federal courts have reversed
a number of recent Board decisions on the issue of intent and have expressed incredulity at
the Board's rationale. In Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994), the Board had held that
a Guatemalan trade unionist whose colleagues had been assassinated, and who had received
death threats, was ineligible for asylum or withholding of deportation because the threatened
persecution was the result of an economic dispute and was not on account of political
opinion. Id. at 1028. In reversing, the court noted that pursuant to the BIA's analysis,
Alexander Solzhenitsyn would not be eligible for political asylum because his dispute with
the government was literary, rather than political. Id. at 1028-29. In Sotelo Aquije v. INS, 17
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1994), the Board had denied relief to a Peruvian community leader who had
suffered numerous threats from the Shining Path Guerrillas for his outspoken opposition to
them. The Board had held that although the "applicant's work ... and his open opposition to
the Shining Path ... were political acts and expressions of political opinion" the harm he
feared was not on account of his political opinion. Id. at 36-37. The court reversed, finding
the Board's rationale to be untenable.
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Torture is universally and unequivocally prohibited in international
law. 4° The prohibition against official torture has attained the status of
a peremptory or jus cogens norm, a norm from which no deviation is
permitted.' 4' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described the interna-
tional consensus regarding the prohibition of torture in Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina:142
[T]he right to be free from official torture is fundamental and
universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international
law, a norm of jus cogens. The crack of the whip, the clamp of the
thumb screw, the crush of the iron maiden, and, in these more
efficient modern times, the shock of the electric cattle prod are
forms of torture that the international order will not tolerate. To
subject a person to such horrors is to commit one of the most
egregious violations of the personal security and dignity of a hu-
man being. 1
43
The Refugee Act was intended to give "statutory meaning to our
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."' 44 It
incorporated the definition of "refugee" in the Convention, which was
drafted in the aftermath of the Holocaust. The Convention, as well as
other postwar international instruments, were intended as an expression
of commitment to the protection of individual human rights. 45 These
instruments were a part of the international community's response to the
unspeakably horrendous crimes of the Nazi era. 146 Viewed in this con-
text, it is difficult to conceive that the Convention or the Refugee Act
were intended to be interpreted in a way that would fail to protect the
140. "[T]he law of nations contains a 'clear and unambiguous' prohibition of official
torture. This proscription is universal, obligatory, and definable." Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
141. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations and Between International Organizations, Mar 21, 1986, art. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 129/11-12 (1986).
142. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 717.
144. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 9, at 1.
145. The Convention Preamble begins as follows: "Considering that the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December
1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy
.fundamental rights and freedoms . 1951 Convention, supra note 11, at 150 (emphasis
added).
146. One commentator has noted that the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights "seemed to be designed specifically as a reaction to the Nazi horrors,
granting individuals the right to be free from such acts of state terror." Steven Fogelson, The
Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfu~fllled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 872 (1990).
1210 [Vol. 15:1179
Summer 19941 Refugee Protections and Human Rights Norms
victims of torture, as well as the victims of other violations of perempto-
ry human rights norms.
47
Equally inconceivable is an interpretation of the Convention and
Refugee Act that would find eligible for refugee status those individuals
who are the perpetrators of prohibited human rights violations. Nonethe-
less, such a conclusion is compelled by Zacarias and current Board
precedent.
The 1980 Refugee Act excludes from its protection individuals who
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."' 148 If the victim of torture is
not persecuted on account of an enumerated ground but simply for the
purpose of extracting information, then the person who tortured them is
not excludable as a persecutor. The symmetry between the language of
eligibility, the "well-founded fear of persecution on account of," and the
language of ineligibility, "persecution of any person on account of,"
compel this conclusion. At least one Board member has noted that this
is the case."'
This interpretation of the Act, which finds torture victims ineligible
for relief because the harm is not on account of an enumerated ground,
while their torturers potentially are eligible since they are not persecu-
tors of others for this very same reason, is truly perverse, and is certain-
ly not in consonance with the international instruments upon which the
Refugee Act was based. Under the Convention, the intent of the torturer
or other perpetrator of human rights abuses is irrelevant with respect to
ineligibility. An individual is excluded from the protection of the Con-
vention if "he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments
147. A state violates jus cogens norms if it engages in genocide, slavery, murder,
prolonged arbitrary detention, or systematic racial discrimination, or causes the disappearance
of individuals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).
148. 1980 Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1988).
149. In his concurrence in In re R-, Board member Heilman argued that if the applicant
were found to have been persecuted, then the policemen would be considered to be persecu-
tors of others, a result with which he ardently disagrees. Heilman states that "[it ill behooves
us to label as agents of persecution the very people the Sikh extremists murder with abandon
when they have the opportunity." In re R-, supra note 120, at 12. Heilman subscribes to the
theory that two wrongs do make a right. Since the Sikhs have violated the human rights of
the police, the police should be able to violate the human rights of the Sikhs. "[H]ere I will
be as blunt as possible: Given the viciousness with which the extremists have murdered so
many persons, among them many policemen and their families, would one realistically expect
gentle treatment [of the Sikhs]?" Id.
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drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes."'' ° The 1945
London Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal'
has been said to be "the most comprehensive definition"'5 2 of these
crimes.' 53 None of these crimes require proof of intent for culpability. 54
In light of Zacarias and Board precedent, one must question wheth-
er the victims of Nazi persecution would come within the protection of
the 1980 Refugee Act. For instance, would the fact that persecution of
the Jews was "carried out not only as an expression of the racist ideolo-
gy of the Nazis but also with an eye toward confiscating as much of the
Jews' personal wealth as possible"' 155 turn the claim into one that was
not sufficiently motivated by an enumerated ground? What about the
fact that "human beings were used for medical experiments in which
pain, suffering, and death were the expected results"?' 56 Would the
Board be likely to find that the perpetrator's motivation was to obtain
scientific information, even though their "methods ... [were] to be
150. 1951 Convention, supra note I1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 150.
151. London Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal].
152. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 150.
153. Art. 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal defines crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity as follows:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurance, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 151, art. 6.
154. Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2586 n.216 (1991) (discussing differences
between war crimes and crimes against humanity, which do not require intent, with genocide,
which does).
155. Fogelson, supra note 146, at 852.
156. Id. at 835.
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condemned"'57 because they implicated "civil rights or human rights
violations?"'15
8
It is not far-fetched that such decisions, abhorrent and illogical as
they appear, could be premised upon the current interpretation of the
Refugee Act. An approach to determining refugee status which rejects
the relevancy of fundamental human rights norms and which utilizes a
proof of intent requirement can only lead to such results. The United
States needs to reinvigorate its commitment to protect fundamental
human rights and to reject an approach to refugee adjudication which
makes it deaf to the cries of the victims, and complicit in the crimes of
the perpetrator.
IV. THE PARADIGM OF THE INTENT TEST'S INADEQUACY:
PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The preceding section surveyed the troubling results of an intent-
based analysis, which essentially divorces international human rights
norms from the determination of refugee status. As illustrated by In re
Konesan, In re Thanapalan, and In re R-, an intent-based approach fails
to provide protection from the violation of fundamental human rights,
such as the right to be free from torture.
The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is another
internationally accepted fundamental human right. The international
approach to protection of religious freedom highlights the inadequacy of
an intent-based test. A comparison of the United States' and internation-
al approaches to the protection of religious liberty shows an expansion
under international norms, with a corresponding trend toward shrinking
protections under domestic law. The reduction of protections for reli-
gious freedom in United States jurisprudence can be traced to the incor-
poration of an intent-based analysis by the Supreme Court in Oregon v.
Smith, which held that limitations of religious freedom do not offend the
Constitution absent intent to impair religious freedom. In the refugee
context, religious persecution will not be found absent a showing of
intent. This contrasts markedly with international practice, which does
not have intent as a frame of reference. To the contrary, irrespective of
intent, limitations on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion may
only be permitted upon a showing that the limitation is necessary "to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
157. Konesan, supra note 118, at 10.
158. Id.
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and freedoms of others."'' 5 9 The United States Congress has seen fit to
reinvigorate the promise of religious freedom guaranteed in the Consti-
tution by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act places United States free exercise
jurisprudence once again on a course consistent with international
norms. Unfortunately, Congress has not seen fit to follow the same path
regarding religious persecution in the refugee context.
A. Freedom of Religion in International Practice
Although the concept of freedom of thought, conscience, and reli-
gion was articulated in the teachings of virtually all of the major world
religions,'6 the practice fell far short of the theory, and religious perse-
cution "on a domestic or national level was for centuries the rule and
seldom the exception."' 6' This fact notwithstanding, freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion received limited recognition in international law
as early as the sixteenth century. In this time period, protection took the
form of treaties, known as "capitulations," which ensured "rights to
individuals or groups professing a religion different from that of the
majority."' 62 An example of such an arrangement was a 1556 treaty
between France and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, guaranteeing
religious freedom for French merchants in Turkey.
Following World War I and the establishment of the League of
Nations, many countries entered into multilateral treaties for the protec-
tion of minorities, including religious minorities. 63 During World War
159. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18(3), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
160. "(T]he concept of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious cares
permeates Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism." Robert E.
Burns, The International Nature of Religious Liberty, 41 U. DET. L.J. 83 (1963). See also
UNITED NATIONS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION
OF MINORITIES; STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND
PRACTICES; REPORT BY SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. 1 (1960) [hereinafter KRISHNASWAMI].
161. Burns, supra note 160, at 83. See also KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 160, at 1
("While most religions and beliefs are imbued with a sense of the oneness of mankind,
history probably records more instances of man's inhumanity to man .... Not infrequently,
horrors and excesses have been committed in the name of religion or belief."). Well-known
examples of religious persecution over the centuries include persecution of Christians by the
ancient Romans, and the suppression of Huguenots in France, Jews and Protestants in Spain,
and Catholics in England. See Burns, supra note 160, at 83. The conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, in which Bosnian Muslims have been the targets of genocide, presents an
unfortunately all too contemporary example of "excesses committed in the name of religion or
belief."
162. Burns, supra note 160, at 87. See also KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 160, at 11.
163. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 160, at 11-12.
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II, the allied leaders stated that the protection of religious freedoms was
a central objective of their war goals. They declared that "complete
victory over [the] enemies is essential to defend . . religious freedom
and to preserve human rights and justice."' 64 The treaties signed at the
end of World War II also focused on the guarantee of freedom from
religious discrimination and persecution. The Paris Peace Treaties of
1947 provided that the vanquished countries were to undertake "all
measures necessary to secure to all persons under its jurisdiction, with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, the enjoyment of
human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom...
of religious worship ....
It was with the establishment of the United Nations, following
World War II, that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, as an international norm, had its basis. The Charter of the
United Nations' 66 encourages respect for "human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, without distinctions as to race, sex, language or reli-
gion."' 167 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided a specific
and more detailed approach to religious freedom. Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.161
The Universal Declaration's travaux reveals that the drafters con-
ceptualized freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as comprehend-
ing both belief and actions.' 69 A preliminary draft prepared by Rene
164. Id. at 12.
165. Id.
166. The U.N. Charter is the "constituent statute of an intergovernmental organization
... [and] has the status of a multilateral treaty." PAUL SIEGHARDT, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 51-52 (1983), quoted in Scott A. Burr, The Principle of Religious
Liberty and the Practice of States: Seek and Ye Shall Find a Violation of Human Rights
Violations, 6 DICK. J. INT'L L. 237, 246 n.43 (1988). Although there is debate over its
binding effect, some commentators contend "that it is now almost universally agreed that the
Charter obligation is binding in international law on all U.N. members." Id.
167. U.N. CHARTER art. I.
168. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
183d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. The Declara-
tion also provides that all persons are "entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Id. art. 2.
169. ALBERT VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARATION
UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 177 (1964).
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Cassin, the representative of France, declared that inner freedom, which
includes freedom of belief in all its forms, is absolute, whereas external
freedom, the freedom to practice one's beliefs, could be subject to
restrictions. 7 0 This distinction between the absolute nature of freedom of
belief and the more relative right to manifest these beliefs is reflected in
the Declaration, which provides that the exercise of guaranteed rights
may be subject "only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society."'' As
discussed below, the principle that freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion is subject to limitations only when justified by significant
societal interests is carried through all the major international instru-
ments addressing religious freedom. Neither the neutrality of a regula-
tion nor the absence of malicious intent will insulate it from a challenge
of impermissible infringement. Instead, the determination will turn on
the nature of the competing societal interest.
In 1956, the United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur, Arcot
Krishnasw mi, to study and evaluate the degree of compliance with the
Universal Declaration's guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion.'72 Krishnaswami's report, submitted in 1960, is considered
to be a landmark treatise'73 which attempted to clarify the principles set
forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration. His report reaffirmed the
principle that a government could interfere with religious freedom only
when religious practices are so "obviously contrary to morality, public
order, or the general welfare that public authorities are ... entitled to limit
170. Id.
171. Universal Declaration, supra note 168, art. 29.2.
172. See KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 160, at v-vii.
173. "The human rights literature, voluminous in many areas, is surprisingly sparse on
the issue of religious intolerance. One of the most noteworthy writings is A. Krishnaswami,
Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices .... Roger S.
Clark, The United Nations and Religious Freedom, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197, 197
n. I (1978). A subsequent U.N. study noted that the Krishnaswami report was:
welcomed not only because of the profound analysis of the problem of discrimina-
tion in the matter of religious rights and practices which it contained, based upon
voluminous information which had been collected . . . but also for its scrupulous
objectivity and for the excellence of its literary style. It was characterized as a
landmark in the efforts of the United Nations to eradicate prejudice and discrimina-
tion based on religion or belief.
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief"
Report by Mrs. Elizabeth Odio Benito, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
39th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 13, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1986) [hereinafter
Benito Report].
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them."' 74 Krishnaswami provided examples of the types of religious
practices which governments would have a justifiable interest in prohibiting,
listing human sacrifice, mutilation of self or others, and forced slavery
or prostitution. 75 In the absence of a legitimate governmental interest,
"everyone should be free to comply with what is prescribed or
authorized by his religion or belief, and free from performing acts
incompatible with the prescriptions of his religion or belief.'
176
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was the
next significant international instrument to address, among other rights,
freedom of religion. 77 The relevant provisions in the covenant are
tailored after Article 18 of the Universal Declaration and includes lan-
guage that allows limitation of the guaranteed right only when the
"limitations ... are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others."'7
8
In 1962, the U.N. General Assembly initiated the preparation of a draft
declaration and convention to eliminate all forms of religious intolerance. '
79
After many delays in its completion' the General Assembly finally
adopted, by unanimous vote, the Declaration on the Elimination of All
174. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 160, at 29.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 63.
177. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 159, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 171. While the binding effect of the Universal Declaration is subject to controversy, the
International Covenant is a binding treaty.
178. Id. at 178. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, in
relevant part:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limita-
tions as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rightsand freedoms of others.
Id.
179. Benito Report, supra note 173, at 1.
180. For a detailed chronology of U.N. action regarding the drafting of the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief,
see generally Burr, supra note 166, at 249 n.65; John Claydon, The Treaty Protection of Religious
Rights: U.N. Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 403 (1972).
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Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. 8 '
While the provisions of. the Declaration are not binding, "they represent
the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification of the ideal of
religious liberty to date."' 82 The Declaration on Religious Intolerance
proclaims the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and
reiterates the same limitation on the right contained in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'83 Subsequent to the adoption of
the Declaration on Religious Intolerance, the United Nations considered
various measures to ensure its implementation, including the appoint-
ment of a Special Rapporteur to study and report on appropriate
measures,184 an appointment which the United States supported.
85
Through these various conventions, declarations, and resolutions, the
international community has developed a framework for defining and
protecting freedom of religion, which is defined as encompassing both
beliefs and actions. From the earliest statement contained in the Univer-
sal Declaration, an analytical approach was instituted which protected
freedom of religion in the absence of compelling countervailing state
interests. This approach was incorporated into subsequent instruments,
including the International Covenant and the Declaration on Intolerance.
Pursuant to this analysis, the focus is on the nature of the countervailing
state interests. Therefore, neither the neutrality of a regulation nor the
absence of invidious intent will immunize a regulation which is not
"necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals."
As discussed in the following section, the protection of religious
freedom in the United States mirrored international practice for a period,
but abruptly retreated from this approach with the Supreme Court's
181. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion and Belief, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Agenda Item 75, U.N. Doc. AIRES136155 (1982)
[hereinafter Declaration on Religious Intolerance]. See also Human Rights: Action Against
Discrimination, 1981 U.N.Y.B. 881-82, U.N. Sales No. E.84.1.1.
182. Burr, supra note 166, at 249-50.
183. The Declaration on Religious Intolerance provides that the right to "manifest one's
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others." Declaration on Religious Intolerance, supra note 181, at 2.
184. Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Report by Mr. Angelo Vidal d'Almeida
Ribero, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 22, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/35
(1986) [hereinafter Ribero Report].
185. "The Commission must face up to ... the urgent need for action to promote
unconditional implementation everywhere of an instrument that the world community ha[s]
unanimously recognized." U.N. ESCOR, Hum Rts. Comm., 42d Sess., 29th mtg. at 14, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1986/SR.29 (1986) (statement of Ms. Byrne).
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decision in Oregon v. Smith.'86 Prior to Smith, the. courts balanced the
free exercise of religion against the interests of the state: Smith eliminat-
ed this balancing requirement and replaced it with an intent-based
analysis. The Smith approach resulted in the virtual evisceration of First
Amendment free exercise protection and necessitated congressional
action to restore it. Refugees who flee religious persecution have not
benefited from Congress' enlightened approach to the Free Exercise
Clause. Zacarias still controls, and refugees fleeing religious persecution
still must prove intent to persecute on the basis of religion. For the same
reasons that an intent requirement is inadequate to secure constitutional
free exercise of religion, it falls short of providing protection from
religious persecution in asylum cases. Although congressional action put
the United States back in step with the international community with
respect to the free exercise of religion, similar action is necessary to
restore protections against religious persecution.
B. Free Exercise Under the First Amendment of the Constitution
Protection of religious freedom in the United States has its basis in
the First Amendment, which provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ."'87 Reynolds v. United States88 was the first case in which
the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause. It held that
although Congress could not regulate an individual's beliefs, it could
legislate against religiously motivated actions.
Reynolds, a Mormon, had been charged with polygamy. He had
defended against the charge by arguing that polygamy was a require-
ment of the Mormon faith. The Court determined that Congress could
prohibit polygamy, even if it were a religious practice, without violating
the Free Exercise Clause.
The rationale in Reynolds was reaffirmed in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis'89 where two Jehovah's Witness children were ex-
pelled from school for refusing to salute the American flag, in confor-
mance with their religion's tenets. In Reynolds and Gobitis, the Court
interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as affording protection only to
beliefs and as not requiring any exemption to neutral governmental
186. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
188. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
189. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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legislation. In neither of these cases did the Court balance the interests
of the religious adherent against those of the State.
The Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut"9 evidenced a
different approach from Reynolds and Gobitis. Cantwell involved a
Jehovah's Witness who had proselytized by playing an anti-Catholic
record in the public streets of New Haven. He had been charged and
convicted of inciting a breach of the peace. In recognition of the ex-
istence of some right to the manifestation of religious beliefs, the Court
overturned the conviction, ruling that the state's interest in keeping the
peace did not outweigh Cantwell's right to spread his religious beliefs.'"'
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'92 the Court
reversed Gobitis and for the first time expressly articulated that the
government was required to balance the right of religious freedom
against the interests of the state. Barnette, like Gobitis, involved the
punishment of Jehovah's Witnesses who violated a statute that required
public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to the American
flag. In affirming the enjoined enforcement of the law against them, the
Court held that freedom of religion could be limited "only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect." 193
In 1963, in the case of Sherbert v. Verner,194 the Court took a giant
step forward in the protection of religious liberty and established strict
scrutiny analysis for cases involving the free exercise of religion. Pur-
suant to this test, a state may infringe on an individual's freedom of
religious action only when the state has a compelling interest in regulat-
ing the behavior and can show no alternative, less burdensome means of
achieving its goal.
95
The petitioner in Sherbert was a Seventh-Day Adventist who had
been fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturday, the day of
Sabbath in her faith, and had been denied unemployment benefits. The
denial had been upheld by the state supreme court. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the conditions of employment had forced her to
violate her religious obligations and that there was no compelling state
interest in the denial of unemployment benefits to her under these
circumstances.
190. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
191. Id.
192. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
193. Id. at 639.
194. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
195. Id. at 403, 406-07.
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The compelling interest test established in Sherbert was consistently
applied in cases involving the. free- exercise of religion until the mid-
1980s. On the basis of the compelling interest test, Amish children were
exempted from mandatory- school attendance requirements,196 and a
Jehovah's Witness was awarded unemployment benefits even though he
had quit his job rather than be involved in the manufacturing ,of military
armaments in violation of his beliefs. 197 The adoption of the compelling
interest test constituted the recognition of the fact that the existence of a
neutral statute did not insulate a governmental regulation from chal-
lenge.
In Oregon v. Smith, the Court reversed the precedent established in
Sherbert and applied in subsequent cases. The Court in Smith held that
no violation of the Free Exercise Clause is found when the interference
with a religious practice is effectuated by the application of a "valid and
neutral law of general applicability."' 198 Because there is no interference,
the government is not required to establish a compelling interest to
justify the ensuing restrictions upon the individual's free exercise of
religion.
Oregon v. Smith involved the unemployment compensation claims
of two Native Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, who had been
dismissed from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation center as a result of
their use of peyote in a religious ceremony. The case came before the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the state of Oregon could con-
stitutionally prohibit the religious use of peyote, 199 "a sacrament of the
196. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
197. Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See
also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (stating that a Chris-
tian who was not a member of a specific sect which prohibited Sunday work could not be
denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Sundays); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a newly converted Seventh Day
Adventist who refused to continue working on Friday evenings and Saturdays after joining the
church could not be denied unemployment benefits).
198. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Serv. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
199. The two claims for unemployment compensation had been denied by the state
employment division, but the state appellate and supreme courts reversed. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court to determine
whether the Oregon statute criminalizing peyote provided an exception for religious use under
the rationale that "if a practice can be punished under the criminal law it may also be the
basis for the lesser penalty of denial of unemployment benefits." Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1990)
[hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]. Professor Michael W. McConnell, who
has written extensively about the free exercise clause, has noted that the Supreme Court's
action was unusual under the circumstances:
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Native American Church ... regarded as vital to respondents' ability to
practice their religion. ' '2' The 'majority held that the state of Oregon
could indeed forbid the sacramental use of peyote and ruled that no
violation of the Free Exercise Clause will be found where the inter-
ference with religious practice is effectuated by the application of a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability. '20' The Court contended
that it had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate. 2 °2
In making this ruling, the Court effectively reversed the preceding
thirty years of free exercise precedent, which had in fact required the
state to demonstrate a compelling interest when a neutral law interfered
with religious practice. The Court attempted to distinguish the precedent
by portraying it as limited to specific circumstances not implicated in
Smith. According to the majority, the compelling interest test was limit-
ed to unemployment insurance claims and claims of a similar nature
where criminal conduct was not involved,20 3 and to hybrid constitutional
claims, such as cases implicating the Free Exercise Clause as well as
other constitutional rights, "such as freedom of speech and of the press
,,204
Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall challenged the
majority's attempt to distinguish its precedent in order to reach the
conclusion in Smith. Justice O'Connor observed that the holding "mis-
reads settled First Amendment precedent," 205 and she reprimanded the
majority for disregarding its own precedent. 206 Justice Blackmun, joined
This disposition was odder than it might appear, since the Oregon Supreme Court
had already held that the criminality of peyote use is "immaterial" to eligibility for
unemployment benefits as a matter of state law. Under Oregon law, being fired for
the use of peyote was like being fired for not working on Saturday; both are work-
related derelictions which, if religiously motivated, could not be treated as miscon-
duct under the First Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted). The Oregon court ruled that the state law provided no exemption for the
sacramental use of peyote, but that this fact was irrelevant since enforcement of the law under
these circumstances would violate the free exercise clause. The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari, this time to decide whether the Oregon statute could constitutionally prohibit the
religious use of peyote. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
200. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903.
201. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
202. Id. at 878-79.
203. Id. at 876.
204. Id. at 881.
205. Id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
206. Justice O'Connor disputed the central rationales of the majority's decision. In
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in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, observed that applica-
tion of the compelling interest test was "a settled and inviolate principle
of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence." 207
The Court's decision in Smith was roundly criticized from many
quarters and prompted successful congressional action to effect its
reversal.208 The legislation that Congress enacted explicitly states that
"laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely
as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise., 20 9 The Court's
Smith decision was also criticized for distorting the original intent of the
Constitution's framers. Professor McConnell, who has written extensive-
ly about the Free Exercise Clause,210 believes that the historical context
of the First Amendment argues against the Court's conclusion in
Smith.2t ' According to Professor McConnell, the drafters of the Free
response to the assertion that the Court had never allowed religious beliefs to justify exemp-
tion from a generally applicable law, Justice O'Connor noted that "in cases such as Cantwell
and Yoder we have in fact interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to forbid application of a
generally applicable prohibition to religiously motivated conduct . I... "d. at 895. "The Court
endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them 'hybrid'
decisions, but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise
Clause." Id. at 896 (citation omitted).
207. Id. at 908.
208. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1991); S. 3254, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), reintroduced 1991 as H.R. 2797, S. 2969. The
bill was supported by a broad spectrum of political interests:
[T]he bill ... has facilitated the establishment of an extraordinary ecumenical
coalition in the Congress of liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats,
Northerners and Southerners, and in the country as a whole, a very broad coalition
of groups that have traditionally defended the interests of the various religious
faiths in our country.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz) [hereinafter Hearings]. Rep. Dannemeyer, a notoriously
conservative legislator, commented on the diversity of interests supporting the bill:
When I looked at the list of people who were sponsoring this . . . my first im-
pression was to say, "Hey, wait a minute; do I belong among these folks?" The
answer clearly is yes, because the decision by Justice Scalia, for whom I have the
greatest respect - I don't know what he had for dinner the night before ... he
produced this decision ....
Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a)(2).
210. See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 199; Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Historical Understanding].
211. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 199, at 1116-17. The failure of
the Court to examine the historical context is "particularly surprising because the author of
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, has been one of the Court's foremost exponents of the
View that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of its original meaning." Id. at 1117.
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Exercise Clause intended it to exempt religious practitioners from gener-
ally applicable laws.212 In reaching this conclusion Professor McConnell
examines the history of free exercise of religion from the colonial
period213 through the process of the framing of the Free Exercise
211
Clause, 2t as well as its early interpretations in federal and state constitu-
tions. 15 His conclusion, based on this exhaustive study, is that "[t]he
modern argument against religious exemptions ... is historically insup-
portable. Likewise insupportable are suggestions that free exercise of
religion is limited to opinions or to profession of religious opinions, as
opposed to conduct.
216
The Smith decision abdicated the Court's responsibility to protect
the free exercise of religion guaranteed through the First Amendment. It
held that governmental regulations which are neutral do not offend the
Constitution, even if they may have the effect, as in Smith, of
criminalizing activities that are essential to religious practice. By making
the neutrality of the regulation the dispositive factor, Smith turned a
blind eye to the impact on the individual in the practice of her religion.
This approach is inconsistent both with Court precedent and with inter-
national norms defining the meaning of freedom of religion.
212. See id. at 1116-19. See also McConnell, Historical Understanding, supra note 210.
213. Professor McConnell states:
The idea of exemptions had deep roots in early colonial charters. . . .From the
beginning it was thought that the solution to the problem of religious minorities
was to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws.
The practice of the colonies and early states bore this out. Most of the colonies and
states ... exempted religious objectors from military conscription and from oath
requirements expressly in order to avoid infringements of their religious conscience.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 199, at 1118.
214. Jefferson and Madison both played central roles in framing the free exercise clause
of the Constitution, although Madison was the principal author of and floor leader for the
First Amendment. Id. at 1119. Jefferson's view of free exercise was narrower than Madison's
in that he "espoused a strict distinction between belief, which should be protected from
governmental control, and conduct, which should not." McConnell, Historical Understanding,
supra note 210, at 1451. According to McConnell, Madison believed that freedom of religion
included exemption from generally applicable laws, and that his "generous vision of religious
liberty[] more faithfully reflected the popular understanding of the free exercise provision that
was to emerge ... in ... the Bill of Rights." Id. at 1455.
215. "The language of the free exercise and liberty of conscience clauses of the state
constitutions, from the early Rhode Island, Carolina, and New Jersey charters to the new
constitutions passed after 1776, strongly supports this hypothesis [that free exercise includes
the possibility of exemptions from generally applicable laws]." Id. at 1512.
216. Id. at 1511-12.
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C. Concepts of Religious Freedom and Religious Persecution in
Refugee Jurisprudence: The Decision in Cafias-Segovia v. INS
The decisions in Smith and Zacarias demonstrate a unified approach
although they arose in distinctly different areas of jurisprudence. The
Ninth Circuit decision of Cahas-Segovia v: INS217 (Cafias 11), which
addresses the issue of religious persecution under the 1980 Refugee Act,
represents a metaphorical marriage of the Smith and Zacarias decisions.
In Cafias II, the court ruled that persecution suffered because of one's
religious beliefs is not religious persecution absent a showing of the
persecutor's intent. This constituted a reversal of the court's earlier
decision, Cafias 1,218 rejecting intent as dispositive.
The Caias-Segovia cases raised the issue of religiously motivated
conscientious objection as a basis for refugee status. The applicants in
Cafias-Segovia were Jehovah's Witnesses from El Salvador.2 9 A central
tenet of Jehovah's Witness faith is abstention from participation in
military service.220 During the time the case was litigated, military
service in El Salvador was mandatory for all men from eighteen to
thirty. The country did not recognize conscientious objectors, but treated
them as deserters, imprisoning them for up to fifteen years. 22' Human
rights violations were pervasive during this time period, and there was
evidence that young men who refused to serve in the military for any
reason were considered to be disloyal to the government and were
subject to extrajudicial sanctions in the form of torture, disappearance,
and assassination.222
The applicants claimed that under these circumstances, at a mini-
mum, they would be imprisoned for refusal to serve, and it was likely
that they would be tortured or disappeared because their refusal would
be interpreted as opposition to the government. 223 The Board had held
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite likelihood of
extrajudicial sanctions, and that the applicants' imprisonment could not
constitute persecution on account of religion because the government
217. Cafias-Segovia v. INS, 902 F2d 717 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Caas /], vacated
and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 1152, remanded, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Cahas
MI].
218. Cahias 11, 970 F.2d at 601.
219. Cahas 1, 902 F.2d at 720.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 720-21.
223. Id. at 720.
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was not motivated to punish them because of their religion, but because
of their refusal to serve. 24 The Board had characterized the conscription
requirement as a neutral statute and ruled that its uniform application
could not, as a matter of law, constitute "persecution on account of
religion" within the meaning of the 1980 Refugee Act.225
In Cafias I, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's
decision. It found the applicants eligible for relief and characterized the
imprisonment they faced for adhering to their beliefs as religious perse-
cution.226 The risk of torture or disappearance was persecution on ac-
count of imputed political opinion. In reaching its decision, the court
ruled that "[i]ntent or motive to persecute is merely one relevant con-
sideration in the analysis of an asylum claim.
227
The court relied to a great extent upon the recommendations of the
Handbook, which provides for two exceptions to the axiom that punish-
ment for refusal to serve in the military is not a basis for refugee status.
The exceptions in the Handbook are where the applicant would suffer
disproportionate punishment on account of race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group,2 s or where
the military service is "contrary to ... genuine political, religious or
moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience., 229 The rationale
underlying the recommendation of refugee status is that individuals
should not be punished for adherence to deeply held religious or politi-
cal convictions. Punishment under these circumstances is, in reality,
230persecution.
In addition to the Handbook's guidance, the Ninth Circuit relied, by
way of analogy, upon pre-Smith First Amendment jurisprudence, observ-
ing that an "elementary tenet of United States constitutional law ... [is]
that a facially neutral policy nonetheless may impermissibly infringe
upon the rights of specific groups of persons. 23' Observing that "United
States jurisprudence is relevant to analysis of new issues of ... refugee
224. In re Cafias-Segovia, Int. Dec. 3074 (BIA 1988).
225. Id.
226. Cahas I, 902 F.2d at 727-28.
227. Id. at 726.
228. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 169.
229. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, 170.
230. For a more extensive discussion of the argument that religiously motivated con-
scientious objection should provide the basis for a claim to refugee status, see Karen Musalo,
Swords Into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide Refugee Status to Young
Men Who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849
(1989).
231. Cafias I, 902 F.2d at 723-24.
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law,, 23 2 the court held that the uniform application of a neutral statute
could interfere with an individual's free exercise of religion.
The INS petitioned for certiorari of Caiias I to the Supreme Court.
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Zacarias it vacated the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Cafias I and remanded it for a decision in light of
Zacarias. On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the portion of the
Cahas I decision 233 that held that imprisonment of the applicants for
refusal to serve in the military would constitute religious persecution.
The court in Cafias H ruled that Zacarias' adoption of a motive require-
ment precluded a finding of religious persecution absent proof of intent.
In light of the fact that conscientious objection has been broadly
recognized "as a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion,2 34 the decision in Caiias H is even
more troubling. The case stands for the problematic rule that the im-
prisonment of an individual for the exercise of the internationally recog-
nized right to freedom of religion is not religious persecution.
Cafias H and Oregon v. Smith reflect the same rationale, although
Congress wisely reversed Oregon v. Smith through legislative action. In
both cases, religious freedoms are interpreted in a way that conflicts
with the developing international trend. As the international community
has increased its protection of religious freedoms, the U.S. Supreme
Court has moved toward an increasingly formalistic analysis. Were it
not for congressional action in the free exercise area, the United States'
promise of religious freedom and protection from religious persecution
would be little more than lip service to an ideal.
V. CONCEPTS OF INTENT IN THE CONTEXT OF
JURISPRUDENTIAL OBJECTIVES
Relying on the plain language of the 1980 Refugee Act, the Su-
preme Court in Zacarias adopted an intent requirement. As discussed in
the preceding sections, an intent requirement is compelled neither by the
plain meaning nor the statutory language of the 1980 Refugee Act.
Furthermore, the requirement of proof of intent is contrary to the ap-
232. Id. at 723 n.11.
233. Cahas 11, 970 F.2d 599.
234. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN THE PROMOTION
AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEC-
TION TO MILITARY SERVICE, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1991/64 at 18 (1991). See also COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMM. OF MINISTERS, Doc. No. R(87)8 (Apr. 1987),
urging that "[a]nyone who, for compelling reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in
the use of arms, shall have the right to be released from the obligation to perform such
service .... Such persons may be liable to perform alternative service." Id.
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proach advocated by the UNHCR. Cases such as In re Konesan, In re
Thanapalan, and In re R- demonstrate the absurd results of an intent-
based analysis. The application of the intent rule in cases involving
freedom of religion, such as Caias II, demonstrates its inadequacy in
protecting the interests at stake and trivializes the concept of religious
freedom.
It is a well recognized principle that statutes are to be construed in a
manner consistent with their objectives.235 In this respect, interpretation
of the Refugee Act should be flexible enough to accomplish the under-
lying legislative purpose, which is to provide protection to the individual
who has a reasonable fear of persecution related to her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
In counseling against an intent requirement in Zacarias, the UNHCR
distinguished the very different policy goals of refugee and criminal law,
noting that "refugee status examiners are not called upon to decide the
criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor, and refugee status is not
dependent on such proof.
236
In the same way that the underlying purpose of a particular statute
influences its interpretation, overarching jurisprudential objectives are
taken into consideration in the development of particular areas of law.
The requirement, or lack thereof, of proof of intent in three distinct
areas of law, criminal, tort, and statutory civil rights, demonstrates
judicial flexibility in the accommodation of jurisprudential objectives.
The requirement of proof of intent in criminal cases has often been
modified to protect perceived societal interests, and tort law has evolved
away from proof of negligence towards absolute or strict liability.
Perhaps most instructive is the treatment of intent in cases arising under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, where an effects analysis was sub-
stituted for an intent requirement more than two decades ago. The
evolution of concepts of intent in these areas provides a valuable
counterpoint to the Supreme Court's decision in Zacarias.
A. Criminal Law
In criminal law, proof of mens rea has long been a requirement.237
235. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) ("In determining the
meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design
of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy." (emphasis added)).
236. UNHCR Brief Amicus Curiae, Zacarias, supra note 72, at 16.
237. Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. 148, 150 (Tenn. 1846).
It is a sound principle of criminal jurisprudence, that the intention to commit the
crime is of the essence of the offence; [sic] and to hold, that a man shall be held
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In the criminal context, proof of intent makes sense and is rooted in the
principle that "only conscious wrongdoing constitutes crime., 238 There-
fore, an individual should not be punished in the absence of a guilty
state of mind. The justice rationale underlying the requirement of proof
of intent is emphasized by the requisite burden of proof applicable in
criminal prosecution; the guilt of an individual must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt before punishment will be imposed.239
Even in the criminal area, the requirement of proof of intent has not
been rigidly or blindly followed. There were exceptions to the rule in
early common law to serve other countervailing societal interests. For
example, statutory rape required no mens rea regarding the victim's age.
In addition, certain acts which endangered the public welfare were
considered criminal in the absence of proof of intent.2' °
Modem criminal law also recognizes the existence of criminal
culpability in the absence of traditional notions of intent.241 This trend
criminally responsible for an offence, [sic] of the commission of which he was
ignorant at the time, would be intolerable tyranny.
Id. See also 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 129 (1981) ("At common law, a crime required
two elements: an act and an evil intention. This view is expressed in the maxim that an act
does not render one guilty unless the mind is guilty.") (footnotes omitted).
238. 21 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 237, § 129.
239. MCCORMICK, note 99, § 341.
The demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently ex-
pressed from ancient times, but its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted...
as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of
all the essential elements of guilt.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), which states:
Use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that
the moral force of the common law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leave
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
240. See Matthew T. Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, United States v. Nofziger and the
Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of
Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 803 (1990). The authors discuss two early
exceptions to the mens rea requirement: crimes for which ignorance of the law was no
defense, such as statutory rape, and "public welfare" offenses, which "came into existence
when the legislature decided to promote the public good by enacting regulations accompanied
by criminal sanctions." Id. at 817.
241. See id. at 822, which states, "[m]odern criminal law is moving away from tradition-
al notions of criminal states of mind and towards more sophisticated conceptions regarding
states of mind and how they should be determined." The authors point to the Model Penal
Code, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 and the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). Id. at 822. In Bailey, the Supreme Court noted with
approval the decision in United States v. Fe ola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975), which held that a
defendant could be convicted for assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § Ill even if
the defendant did not know his victim was a federal officer. Id. at 825 n. 102.
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has been evident in the area of environmental criminal prosecutions,
where corporate officials have been held criminally liable even though
they did not know about, or intend to cause, the prohibited harm.242 The
underlying rationale in many of these cases is that "[iun the interest of
the larger good ... a person otherwise innocent but ... in responsible
relation to a public danger" may be held guilty.243 Prosecutions of
women who ingest drugs while pregnant under statutes that prohibit the
delivery of drugs to a minor demonstrate this same erosion of the con-
cept of intent in pursuance of perceived societal interests. 244 Courts that
have entered such convictions have been criticized for "manipulat[ing] a
statute" to reach what it perceives to be a socially desirable result.245
Regardless of what one thinks of the elasticity of the mens rea concept
as evidenced in the context of criminal law, it demonstrates that the
courts are willing to make it easier to prove intent if it serves public
policy goals.
B. Tort Law
Developments in tort law are also illustrative of the way in which
public policy concerns influence rules regarding intent and liability. The
overriding purpose of tort law is to make the injured person whole.2 46
For this reason, from early common law, the fault of the actor was less
242. See Ruth A. Weidel et al., The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100 (1991), which states, "[t]he enactment and
judicial interpretation of criminal environmental statutes ... has eroded the traditional
requirement of mens rea." Id. The authors discuss the modification of the mens rea require-
ment and observe that "[t]he development of regulatory statutes designed to protect the public
welfare has resulted in responsible corporate officials being exposed to criminal liability even
though they lack personal knowledge and did not personally participate in the illegal act." Id.
at 1101.
243. Id. at 1102 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943)).
244. See Michelle D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An
Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401 (1990), discussing
the use of statutes criminalizing delivery of drugs to minors to pregnant mothers. Charges
were brought under these statutes in the states of Georgia, Florida, Michigan, Massachusetts
and South Carolina in 1989. In Florida, a court convicted a woman who had been using
cocaine when her two children were born. State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (18th Cir.,
Seminole County, Fla., July 13, 1989). The court found that the delivery of cocaine to the
children occurred when it passed "from the body of the mother into the body of her child
through the umbilical cord after birth occurs." Wilkins, supra, at 1410 (quoting State v.
Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA, slip op. at I).
245. Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the
Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 558. "These statutes are not intended to apply to mothers
because mothers do not 'intend' to deliver drugs to their fetus within the intended meaning of
the statute." Id. at 558.
246. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOa, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.3(b) (1986) ("The function of tort law is to compensate someone who is injured for the
harm he has suffered.").
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significant than the harm to the victim,247 and liability could be estab-
lished upon a showing of ordinary negligence.2 48 Negligence inquires
into state of mind only to the extent that it assesses whether the defen-
dant "knew or should have known that his activity would cause the type
of injury charged., 249 Development of the theory of "absolute" or
"strict" liability eliminated the requirement of establishing negligence
under certain circumstances. 250 There are several policy rationales for
this shift,25' including "the extreme practical difficulty of proving the
negligence of a manufacturer or supplier., 252 Because of the difficulty of
proof, "an approach which conditions a plaintiff's recovery on the
ability to prove negligence is inadequate. 253
In certain respects, the policy objectives of tort law share greater
similarity to refugee law than do the objectives of criminal law. In both
tort and refugee law, the focus is on providing a remedy for the victim
rather than on punishing the actor - a central preoccupation of criminal
law. To the extent that they share this similarity, the shift away from
intent to negligence or strict liability in tort law supports the argument
that the requirement of proof of intent in refugee law is misplaced.
Moreover, although the underlying purposes of criminal law are quite
distinct from those of the refugee regime, the erosion of an intent re-
247. As Richard Faulk noted in his historical analysis of absolute liability:
As early as 1681, the common law of torts recognized that "the law doth not so
much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering."
Although individual morality remained a consideration in some forms of action, tort
law gradually evolved toward broader considerations of social welfare. In this
perspective, "fault" was determined by the interests of society in compensating
injury and in deterring unacceptable conduct; considerations of individual blame
were increasingly neglected.
Richard 0. Faulk, "Absolute Liability": Historical Perspectives and Political Alternatives, 37
OKLA. L. REV. 569, 569 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
248. 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 246, § 1.3(b) ("Ordinary negligence is a common
basis of tort liability, but more than ordinary negligence is usually required in the criminal
law.").
249. Faulk, supra note 247, at 569.
250. See John A. Chanin, Lust on Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim Compensation,
and Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 365, 378-95 (1991) (discus-
sing the departure from negligence and the development of the theory of strict liability).
251. Policy rationales for strict liability include: (1) social fairness; i.e., even though the
defendant is faultless, the victim has no relation to the cause of injury; (2) economic efficien-
cy; i.e., the tortfeasor is in the best position to distribute the costs to the community; and (3)
environmental factors, i.e., that such a rule encourages companies to make products safer to
bring down the costs of production. Id. at 385-86.
252. Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Comparative Negligence and Strict
Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 19, 25 (1988).
253. Id. at 26.
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quirement in criminal law highlights the elasticity of the concept of
intent and its adaptation to serve societal interests.
C. Anti-Discrimination Law
An even tighter analogy may be drawn between the jurisprudential
objectives of the refugee regime and statutory anti-discrimination law as
codified in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Both jurisprudential
systems seek to redress mistreatment, for example, "persecution" in the
refugee context and "discrimination" in the civil rights context,254 which
is imposed as a consequence of an individual's status or beliefs. Title
VII protects against employment discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, national origin, or religion; the 1980 Refugee Act attempts to
redress persecution which is suffered on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
Because of the similarity in the language describing the required nexus
- "on the basis of' and "on account of' - as well as the parallel
objectives of the statutory schemes, Title VII jurisprudence regarding
proof of intent provides a useful comparison.
Shortly after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Supreme Court ruled that individuals seeking redress under Title VII of
the Act were not required to demonstrate intent to discriminate. In 1971,
in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,255 the Supreme
Court held that Title VII addressed effects and did not require proof of
discriminatory intent: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion. 256 The Griggs decision articulated the principle that reliance upon
proof of intent 257 was inadequate to implement the legislative ideals of
the Civil Rights Act.
254. The concepts of "discrimination" and "persecution" are not mutually exclusive, but
in fact often overlap. For example, cumulative measures of discrimination may often con-
stitute persecution, and persecution oftentimes results from prejudice or discrimination. The
Handbook recognizes the interrelationship of the two concepts and discusses circumstances
under which discrimination amounts to persecution. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, W 54-55.
255. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
256. Id. at 432.
257. In addition to addressing the issue of intent, the Griggs decision also established
rules allocating the burden of proof in Title VII claims. This aspect of Griggs is also useful
for evaluating the issue of burden of proof in asylum claims, and will be discussed in Section
VI, infra.
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Title VII jurisprudence is not the only statutory antidiscrimination
scheme to dispense with intent as a requirement. For example, under the
Voting Rights Act, Congress made it clear that it "meant to allow
plaintiffs ... to prevail if they demonstrated either intent or effects. 258
Effects alone are also sufficient under the Equal Pay Act of 196 3.2i9
Constitutional claims of discrimination arising under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do require proof of
intent.260 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this has not always been
the case. As several commentators have noted, during the course of this
century, the Court's decisions "followed a confusing and contradictory
path '26 and fluctuated between intent and effects.262 The adoption of an
intent requirement has met with a significant amount of criticism:263 The
258. J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent: Lessons from LA., 7 J.L. & POL'Y
591, 703 (1991), (citing S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982)). See also Pamela
S. Karlan, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent,
93 YALE L.J. I 11, 111 n.3 (1983) (noting that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982
established an effects test in Voting Rights Act vote dilution cases).
259. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
260. The requirement of proof of intentional discrimination was established in Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The
Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151(1991). "Since 1976, when the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, fourteenth
amendment equal protection claims have required proof of intentional discrimination." Id. at
1152 (footnote omitted).
261. Kousser, supra note 258, at 690.
262. "The Supreme Court's route to this basic principle [the necessity of proof of
discriminatory intent] has been rather schizophrenic." Karlan, supra note 258, at I l1 n.3.
263. The criticism has focused both on the difficulty of proving intent, as well as the
inadequacy of an intents test to protect the interest at stake. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note
260, at 1160-62.
Dissatisfaction with the discriminatory purpose standard has two distinct facets.
One is the difficulty of proving discriminatory purpose .... Several commentators
have argued that sophisticated discriminators will conceal their purposes.
Drawing on developing social science data concerning the prevalence and
manifestations of unconscious racism, recent writers have contended that race-based
decisionmaking is common, and have pointed out the impossibility of adducing
evidence that a decision was made "because of' race when the decisionmaker
himself is unaware that race influenced his choice.
A second facet of the anti-Davis commentary argues that intentional, "because of'
race discrimination provides a too limited vision of the goal of equality embodied
in the fourteenth amendment. Most broadly, Alan Freeman has argued that intent
tests wrongly adopt a perpetrator's perspective on discrimination; from the victim's
perspective, effects are of greater importance.
Id. at 1161-62 (footnotes omitted).
For two excellent discussions of the concept of unconscious racism and the inadequacy
of an intent-based analysis, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); David B. Op-
penheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).
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primary policy argument often proffered in defense of an intents test in
equal protection cases is that an effects test would have potentially
"disruptive consequences of wholesale invalidation of facially neutral
laws. ' '2 4
In the context of refugee law, the same policy reasons that support a
Title VII effects-based analysis apply. Reliance upon intent is inadequate
to implement the legislative ideals of the 1980 Refugee Act. None of the
policy arguments relied upon to defend against an effects test in equal
protection cases are applicable. The grant of protection to an individual
who has suffered a violation of his or her rights is a humanitarian action
between the State and the individual. As such, it does not implicate any
of the alleged adverse consequences raised in the equal protection area.
Given the absence of compelling countervailing policy objectives, an
effects rather than intent framework should apply to refugee claims.
2 65
264. Karlan, supra note 258, at 111-12. See also Kousser, supra note 258, at 697, in
which Professor Kousser notes that an effects test in Equal Protection cases was rejected by
the Court at least in part because its application raised the specter of a slippery slope of the
invalidation of neutral laws which had racially disproportionate impacts:
Under the equal protection clause, said Justice White for a 7-2 majority in Wash-
ington v. Davis, "a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." It would not be unconstitutional "solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Otherwise - this was the
slippery slope on the effect side - all sorts of tax, welfare, regulatory, and other
policies that bore more heavily on members of one race than of another would be
drawn into question.
Id. at 697 (footnotes omitted).
265. The argument is made in this article that the question of the meaning of "on
account of' can be answered by reference either to an intents or to an effects based analysis,
and that the latter approach more faithfully conforms to the purposes of the 1951 Refugee
Convention. I want to thank my colleague, Professor James C. Hathaway, for challenging me
with his analysis, which embraces neither an intents nor an effects framework. Professor
Hathaway reads the phrase "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion" as identifying statuses or beliefs which might
lead to marginalization, and therefore a failure of protection, within the home country:
Refugee law exists in order to interpose the protection of the international com-
munity in situations where resort to national protection is not possible. Because it is
fundamentally a form of surrogate or substitute protection, the beneficiaries of
refugee law have always been defined to exclude those who enjoy the basic
entitlements of membership in a national community, and who ought reasonably to
vindicate their basic human rights against their own state. Refugees are unprotected
persons, not just in the sense that their basic liberties or entitlements are in jeopar-
dy, but more fundamentally because it is impossible for them to work within or
even to restructure the national community of which they are nominally a part in
order to exercise those human rights. Their position within the home community is
not just precarious; there is also an element of fundamental marginalization which
distinguishes them from other persons at risk of serious harm.
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 135 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
Viewed in this framework, Professor Hathaway argues that the on account of clause is
"about neither intent nor effect per se but is rather an attempt to identify particularly critical
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This article has made two main arguments against Zacarias' im-
position of an intent requirement: (1) proof of persecutor's intent sub-
verts the humanitarian objectives of the international refugee regime,
and (2) proof of intent poses a virtually insurmountable barrier given the
difficulty of producing evidence on the issue of state of mind of the
persecutor. It is recommended that the damage worked by Zacarias be
rectified by eliminating the requirement of proof of intent or by
establishing certain rebuttable evidentiary presumptions in favor of the
applicant on the issue of the "on account of' nexus. These changes
could be brought about through congressional amendment to the 1980
Refugee Act or by executive action in the form of regulations inter-
preting the already existing legislation.
Precedent certainly exists for Congress to reverse or overrule Su-
preme Court decisions. Congress' response to Oregon v. Smith was to
nullify it by enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned, in substantial measure,
a number of Supreme Court decisions diluting civil rights protections.26
Referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, one commentator noted that
"[t]his is not the first time Congress has had to respond to the current
Supreme Court in this way. 267 The Justice Department has issued a
legal memorandum softening the effect of Zacarias, but the memoran-
dum does not go far enough in dealing with the decision's major
defects.
A. Elimination of Intent of the Persecutor as a Requirement
It is recommended that the intent requirement of Zacarias be elim-
inated and replaced with a more flexible analysis, consistent with the
language and purpose of the Refugee Act and with international prac-
forms of social marginalization which warrant the unusual response of disengagement, rather
than the normal response of seeking internal redress." Memorandum from James C. Hathaway
to Karen Musalo (Apr. 8, 1993) (on file with author). "[W]hat matters is whether there is a
nexus between lack of a genuine ability to 'right the wrong' internally and membership in a
group defined by one of the five grounds, whether or not the harm itself was inflicted
because of one of the five grounds. Id.
I do not disagree with Professor Hathaway's understanding of the "on account of"
clause; nor are we in disagreement that the Supreme Court's imposition of an intent require-
ment in Zacarias thwarts the objectives of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, in the
context of American jurisprudence I believe that the intents-effect analysis provides a more
familiar and useful framework for adjudicating claims under the 1980 Refugee Act.
266. Symposium, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 896, 898 (1992).
267. Id.
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tice, as recommended by the UNHCR. It is proposed that the approach
developed by the Ninth Circuit prior to Zacarias, in such cases as
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,268 Desir v. Ilchert,269 and Cahas 1,270 serve as
the model for determining the required relationship between persecution
and one of the enumerated grounds.
In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected an
analysis which devolved exclusively on the persecutor's motivation. The
Court set forth its approach and explained it as follows:
"Persecution" occurs only when there is a difference between the
persecutor's views or status and that of the victim; it is oppression
which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a difference
that the persecutor will not tolerate. For this reason, in determining"
whether threats or violence constitute political persecution, it is
permissible to examine the motivation of the persecutor; we may
look to the political views and actions of the entity or individual
responsible for the threats or violence, as well as to the victim's,
and we may examine the relationship between the two.
271
In Desir v. lchert, the Ninth Circuit applied this approach, which
examines both sides of the persecution equation, to the claim of a
Haitian asylum seeker. The applicant, Fritz Desir, had been arrested and
severely beaten by Tonton Macoutes because of his refusal to pay bribes
to them.272 The BIA denied the application, holding that the Tonton
Macoutes had not beaten Desir for a reason enumerated in the 1980
Refugee Act, but "because they wished to extort money from him for
personal reasons., 273 The Ninth Circuit held that the persecution was
indeed political, rather than personal. It reached this conclusion by
finding that although extortion in individual cases may have benefited
members of the Tonton Macoutes, in the larger context of repression in
Haiti, "the intimidation and fear thereby engendered accrued to the
268. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
269. Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
270. Cafias-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990).
271. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d at 516 (citation omitted).
272. Haitian dictator Francois Duvalier, also known as "Papa Doc," created his own
personal security force, the Volunteers for National Security (VSN). The VSN quickly
became known as "Tonton Macoutes," the mythical bogeymen of Haiti. PAUL FARMER, THE
USES OF HAITI 107-08 (1994). The Tonton Macoutes were responsible for "large-scale
corruption, violence and harassment, including illegal arrests, detention in unknown places,
interrogation under torture, and killings; they also engaged in activities of extortion and raids
on public meetings." EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 696 (1991).
273. Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d at 725.
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benefit of the Duvalier regime." 274 From this perspective, "the treatment
endured by Desir is more properly understood as motivated by 'polit-
ical' rather than 'personal' interests. 275
In Caias I, discussed in detail above in Section IV.C, the Ninth
Circuit found the requisite nexus absent proof of persecutor's intent
because the risk of persecution was directly related to the applicant's
adherence to religious beliefs. The Cafiases had a well-founded fear of
being imprisoned because their religious beliefs precluded their par-
ticipation in the Salvadoran military. Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's
approach as articulated in Cafias I, harm which would not befall an
applicant but for her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group, is harm on account of the
enumerated ground, regardless of the persecutor's motivation.
The Ninth Circuit's framework allows the type of flexibility neces-
sary to implement the goals of the 1980 Refugee Act. It does not limit
itself to a rigid correlation between the persecutor's intent and, the
victim's status or beliefs. Rather it examines the beliefs, statuses, and
motivations on both sides of the persecutor equation, the victim and the
persecutor. Within this framework, harm which is imposed in order to
implement the persecutor's political objectives, as well as harm which
would not have occurred but for the victim's status or beliefs, satisfies
the "on account of' requirement.
B. Establishing Presumptions in Favor of the Applicant
The Court in Zacarias ruled that the applicant must produce some
evidence "direct or circumstantial" of the persecutor's intent. Evidence
of state of mind is difficult to produce, and cases such as In re Konesan,
In re Thanapalan, and In re R- demonstrate the inappropriately high
burden of persuasion being imposed on asylum applicants. The al-
lowance of evidentiary presumptions 276 in favor of the applicant would
go a long way toward redressing this dilemma. It is proposed that
rebuttable presumptions on the issue of "on account of' be established
whether or not the intent requirement is eliminated in recognition of
difficulties of proof confronting the asylum seeker.
274. Id. at 728.
275. Id.
276. "A presumption ... is a rule of law that deals with the assumption ... of a certain
factual situation based upon proof of other usually logically related facts." Belton, supra note
100, at 1222.
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1. Presumptions Establishing Proof of Intent
Once again, pre-Zacarias Ninth Circuit jurisprudence provides a
model for the recommended approach. In Hernandez-Ortiz the court
ruled that persecutory actions by a government against an individual
who has not "engaged in criminal activity or other conduct that would
provide a legitimate basis for governmental action" will be presumed to
be politically motivated.277 The Hernandez-Ortiz presumption could be
expanded to provide that acts of persecution by governmental or non-
governmental entities which have a political agenda, such as guerrilla
groups, in the absence of a legitimate purpose, will be presumed to be
politically motivated.
2. Presumptions Arising from Disparate Impact
In conjunction with the Hernandez-Ortiz presumption, it is recom-
mended that a second presumption be developed to provide that acts of
persecution which disparately impact groups of a specific race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or particular social group give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the acts are on account of the status or
belief disparately impacted. This presumption would shift the burden of
persuasion to the government to establish that there is no reasonable
basis for believing that the harm was on account of the victim's status
or beliefs.
This type of disparate impact analysis is not unfamiliar to courts,
which have utilized it in Title VII employment discrimination cases
since Griggs.278 Pursuant to Griggs, business practices that had a dis-
parate impact upon a protected class were unlawful. Upon a showing of
disparate impact, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to
establish that the practice was required by business necessity. The
Supreme Court reversed much of Griggs in its 1989 decision, Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.279 Congress, however, restored Griggs
through passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The development of an evidentiary rebuttable presumption in favor
of the applicant would constitute a long overdue recognition of the
difficulty of proof in refugee cases. Furthermore, it would shift the focus
away from the persecutor's intent and bring it back to the effects of the
persecutor's actions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would
277. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
278. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
279. Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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begin to redress the bias that results in the virtual requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of the prima facie elements of an applicant's
claim.
Under the proposed presumptions, the gravity of the harm already
suffered, or feared in the future, should be a relevant factor. The greater
the violation of the individual's fundamental rights, the more difficult it
should be to rebut the presumption that it is on account of one of the
enumerated grounds. This would have the effect of better incorporating
international human rights norms into the refugee adjudication process.
It would also be consistent with burden of proof principles that take into
consideration the gravity of a wrong decision.
Canada, which is also a signator of the Convention on the Status of
Refugees, is an example of a country that has moved toward more
directly incorporating international human rights norms into its refugee
determinations. Its recently released Guidelines on Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender Related Persecution280 illustrate this move-
ment. These guidelines came into existence to address the specific
analytical issues presented by the claims of women seeking asylum.
Women often suffer persecution because of their status as women; they
are subjected to dress code requirements, limitations on their educational
and professional options, and other forms of discriminatory treatment.
The application of a strict "on account of' analysis often results in the
failure of protection to women claimants. In response to the inadequate
protection provided by traditional analysis, the Canadian guidelines
recommend liberal use of the "social group" enumerated ground.
Whenever the feared harm constitutes a violation of internationally
guaranteed rights, the guidelines suggest that the adjudicator find that
the harm is "on account of' membership in a particular social group.
The group is defined by reference to the female claimant and her par-
ticular situation. In effect, this liberal use of the social group basis
incorporates international human rights norms and guarantees protection
when there is a reasonable risk of their violation.
CONCLUSION
The decade of the 1990s has already witnessed major tranformations
and developments in the international community; the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union and the subsequent unleashing of ethnic violence
are but a few of the many significant contemporary changes. In the
280. Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration
Act: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Immigration and
Refugee Board, Mar. 9, 1993.
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midst of increasing uncertainty and change, the importance of interna-
tional standards and rules of law is heightened. The increased role of the
United Nations in both peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, for
example, is an implicit recognition of the importance of international
norms. The international definition of refugee articulated in the Refugee
Convention and Protocol was acceded to by the United States in 1968.
Although legislation bringing the United States into compliance with the
international standard was long in coming, Congress is to be lauded for
conforming U.S. law to international law in its enactment of the 1980
Refugee Act.
The 1980 Refugee Act was an expression of lofty American ideals
to conform with international refugee protections and to extend a genu-
ine welcome to individuals fleeing persecution in their homelands.
Zacarias and its progeny have transformed the promise of an extended
hand to fleeing refugees into a meaningless gesture. The time has come
for a reassessment of United States policy and an examination of the
extent of national commitment to international norms. An appropriate
place to begin would be a reevaluation of the incorporation of an intent
requirement into the refugee definition. This requirement has led to
indefensible decisions, which deny protection to individuals fleeing the
infliction of torture and other human rights violations. If the United
States aspires to be a leader in the "new world order," then it should
lead - and hopefully it will do so in a direction worthy of following.
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